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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the Supreme Court has demonstrated an increasingly
expansive view of preclusion doctrine. In a series of cases over the past
decade, the Supreme Court has endorsed the application of statutory and
common law preclusion to bar litigation of federal civil rights claims in
federal court. The cases in which such issues arose involved the impact of
state court and state agency determinations on subsequent federal civil rights
actions. The Court has held that section 1738, the full faith and credit
statute,' requires federal courts to give state court judgments the same
preclusive effect as would the courts of the state in which the judgment
was rendered, 2 that section 1738 applies to the issue as well as claim
preclusion rules of the rendering state, 3 and that Congress did not intend
actions brought pursuant to section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act to be
4
excepted from section 1738.
The Court's expansive application of preclusion has reached both reviewed
and unreviewed state agency determinations. In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,' the Court held that section 1738 prohibited a federal court
from hearing a Title VII claim brought by a plaintiff who had lost before
the state human rights agency and had unsuccessfully challenged that
decision in state court.6 In University of Tennessee v. Elliott,7 although the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
Migra v. Warren School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84 (1984).
Allen, 449 U.S. at 99; Migra, 465 U.S. at 83-84.
456 U.S. 461 (1982).
Id. at 468.

7. 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
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Court held that section 1738 was inapplicable to unreviewed state agency
determinations, it nonetheless developed a common law rule of preclusion
to operate in the absence of a governing statute.8 The Court decided that
to give preclusive effect to an unreviewed agency factual determination on
a subsequent Title VII claim would clash with congressional intent 9 while
applying preclusion to a determination of the same agency on a subsequent
section 1983 claim would not. 10
The path the Court has taken in Kremer and Elliott and the preclusion
cases that preceded it is an unfortunate one. The Court has frustrated the
substantive purpose of the civil rights laws through its rigid approach to
section 1738. By borrowing from full faith and credit statute doctrine to
formulate a common law doctrine of preclusion for unreviewed state agency
determinations, the Court ignores the functional differences between agencies
and courts. The -fundamental reasons for the existence of administrative
agencies-the need for less expensive, less formal, speedy alternatives to
litigation for the resolution of disputes, for instance-find no expression in
the Court's common law administrative preclusion doctrine. Instead, the
Court's generous application of preclusion doctrine to the determinations
of administrative agencies undercuts the goals of the civil rights statutes by
creating obstacles to effective redress of civil rights violations, depriving
aggrieved parties of their day in court, and thereby heralding preclusion's
goals as superior to those of the civil rights laws.
It is the thesis of this Article that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, courts should refuse to give preclusive effect to agency determinations in subsequent litigation of claims arising under any federal civil rights
statute, regardless of whether state courts would do so. The need for finality
and repose must be balanced with the need to insure vindication of civil
rights claims. What is needed is an alternative to preclusion, one that will
preserve the values of informality and expediency served by administrative
agencies, without sacrificing litigants' rights to a federal forum for vindication of federal claims not resolved through agencies' alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms. Such an alternative, however, must allow for appropriate deference to agency determinations.
Part I of this Article discusses the evolution of the application of common
law and statutory preclusion to administrative determinations generally, and
the purpose and functions of administrative agencies in furthering enforcement of the federal civil rights laws. Part II reviews the Supreme Court's
civil rights preclusion decisions over the past decade and demonstrates the
awkwardness of the Elliott decision's bifurcated approach to preclusion.

8. Id. at 794.
9. Id. at 795-96.
10. Id. at 796-99.
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Part III reveals the inadequacy of the Court's approach to administrative

preclusion by surveying the variables informing the administrative preclusion
analysis. Part IV explores the tension between the elements of proper
preclusion and the reality of the administrative process. Part V suggests

that the Court's recent unwillingness to find exceptions to section 1738 and
common law preclusion is an unnecessary departure from precedent. Part
V further examines the scope and legitimacy of the respective federal and
state interests in applying preclusive effect to agency determinations, to

explain why courts should make exceptions for civil rights cases. This
consideration includes some doctrinal development in state law on the
preclusive effect of agency determinations. Finally, Part VI develops an

alternative to administrative preclusion in subsequent civil rights litigation.
I suggest that using agency determinations to create presumptions and alter

burdens of proof is a better alternative than broad preclusion because it
affords deference to agency determinations while accommodating important
state and federal interests.
I.

A CLASH OF GOALS: PRECLUSION, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
AND CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT

The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel-claim and issue
preclusion'-serve important interests in assuring repose to disputes, finality
and predictability of decisions, and in reducing costs associated with multiple

adjudications of the same matter. In a number of cases the Court has
upheld application of the doctrine despite challenges supported by strong
2
equitable arguments.'

11. Under the doctrine of res judicata [or claim preclusion], a judgment on the
merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies
based on the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel [or
issue preclusion] ... the second action is under a different cause of action and
the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated
and necessary to the outcome of the first action.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979). Following the lead of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 74 (1982), courts increasingly use the term "claim
preclusion" in lieu of "resjudicata" or "merger" and "bar," and "issue preclusion" in lieu
of "collateral estoppel."
12. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), is a case in point. Five
of seven plaintiffs who unsuccessfully sued on identical antitrust claims appealed the district
court's determination that federal law provided no remedy; the other two (Moitie and Brown)
abandoned their federal suit and sought relief under state law in state court. Defendants
succeeded in removing the Moitie and Brown suits to federal court and having them dismissed
for res judicata. However, before any of the seven cases reached the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court, in an unrelated case, held that a federal antitrust remedy existed. Consequently,
the court of appeals determined that "simple justice" demanded an exception to res judicata
for Moitie and Brown because of these peculiar circumstances. The Supreme Court reversed,
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The Evolution of the Application of Preclusion and Section
1738 to Agency Determinations

Traditionally, the doctrine of preclusion embraced by the Court arose in
the context of judicial litigation. Fewer than fifty years ago, the notion that
agency determinations might have preclusive effect in court proceedings was
strange indeed." Not only did courts hold the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel inapplicable to agency determinations, such determinations were given scant deference by reviewing courts.1 4 As Professor
Perschbacher has written, "most courts viewed administrative hearings as
specialized proceedings lacking the disinterested decision-making machinery
and formality of judicial action," and "agency determinations were not
even considered adjudications."' 5 As administrative agencies grew in size
and number and began to engage in more quasi-judicial activity, their
adjudicatory functions gained acceptance if not respect. It was hardly
surprising therefore that the critical distinctions between what agencies do
and what courts do began to blur. In 1932, in Crowell v. Benson,16 the
Supreme Court endorsed the notion that congressional vesting of certain
(but not all) fact-finding functions in administrative agencies did not violate
article III, even though the determinations would not be subject to de novo

stating:

"Simple justice" is achieved when a complex body of law developed over a
period of years is evenhandedly applied. The doctrine of res judicata serves vital
public interests beyond any individual judge's ad hoc determination of the equities
in a particular case .... The Court of Appeals' reliance on "public policy" is
similarly misplaced. This Court has long recognized that "[p]ublic policy dictates
that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall
be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be
considered forever settled as between the parties."
Id. at 401 (quoting Baldwin v. Iowa Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931)). The
Court relied, in part, on its decision in Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 198 (1932) (holding that
party who had successfully appealed adverse determination concerning bequest of property,
but failed to appeal adverse determination in related ejectment action, was barred by res
judicata from subsequently pursuing own ejectment action); see also Atwood, State Court
Judgments in Federal Litigation: Mapping the Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND.
L.J. 59, 63 (1982) ("The basic principle of res judicata reflects a paradox: finality in judicial
decisions is desirable not because courts are infallible but because they are fallible. The
possibility that different courts will reach different conclusions on the same issue renders
necessary a 'convention of finality.' "). But see Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L.
REv. 603, 614-15 (1985) (arguing that the Court has failed to explore competing values in
choosing preclusion over alternatives and has heralded finality, not as a "normative conclusion," but as if its supremacy were predetermined).
13. See Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Limiting the Preclusive Effect of
Administrative Determinations in JudicialProceedings, 35 U. FiA. L. REv. 422, 431 (1983);
Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281, 285 (1906) (decisions of executive departments cannot
constitute resjudicata).
14. See Perschbacher, supra note 13, at 431.
15. Id.
16. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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review by article III courts.17 Crowell arose in the context of direct judicial
review of an agency determination, and was not, therefore, a preclusion

case. Eight years later, in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,"s the
Court applied preclusion to an administrative determination in a collateral
proceeding for the first time. The precluded issue, however, was a narrow
one, and the relationship between the two proceedings substantial.

9

Other

decisions of the Court during this time period continued to hold the line
on expanding the preclusive effects of agency determinations. 20
Nonetheless, administrative preclusion seeped into the landscape of the
law. In 1966, the Court held in United States v. Utah Construction &
Mining Co.21 that Congress intended the Wunderlich Act to require courts
to give issue preclusive effect to the determinations of the federal Board of

Contract Appeals. 22 The Court was not promulgating a common law rule
of preclusion in Utah Construction; it was merely divining congressional
intent. 23 The Court did indulge, however, in rather broad and sweeping

dicta: "When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and
resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have

had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to

17. Id. at 54. Crowell held that while Congress could constitutionally vest the final
determination of "ordinary" facts-like who did what to whom-in the United States Employees' Compensation Commission, Congress could not preclude federal courts from deciding
de novo other, "jurisdictional" facts-like whether the incident giving rise to the injury
occurred upon the navigable seas, or whether an employment relationship in fact existed
between the defendant and the plaintiff. See Perschbacher, supra note 13, at 431 n.48.
18. 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
19. In Sunshine, the National Bituminous Coal Commission had denied Sunshine's claim
for exemption from a sales tax, finding that its coal was, in fact, bituminous and therefore
subject to the tax. When the IRS moved to collect the tax, Sunshine filed a federal court
action to enjoin the tax collection asserting, inter alia, identical grounds to its assertions before
the Coal Commission. Id. at 402. Thus, even in this case, the "collateral" proceeding was
integrally tied to the initial proceeding.
20. See Perschbacher, supra note 13, at 432-33 n.54 and cases cited therein.
21. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
22. Id. at 419-20.
[W]hen the Board of Contract Appeals has made findings relevant to a dispute
properly before it and which the parties have agreed shall be final and conclusive,
these findings cannot be disregarded and the factual issues tried de novo in the
Court of Claims when the contractor sues for relief which the board was not
empowered to give.
Id. at 420.
23. See Freedom Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1180 (1lth Cir. 1985) (Utah
Construction holding was limited to particular congressional scheme). Some courts and commentators have viewed the holding of Utah Construction as even narrower than I have
suggested. Since the agreement to submit such disputes to final determination by the Board
was part of the standard contract between the procurement agencies and the contractor, the
narrowest holding is that the Court was merely carrying out the intent of the parties to the
contract. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 734 F.2d 1157,
1166 n.9 (6th Cir. 1984); Perschbacher, supra note 13, at 433-34 n.57.
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apply res judicata to enforce repose." 4 Yet none of the cases cited by the
Utah Construction Court in support of this proposition involved the preclusive effect to be accorded unreviewed state administrative agencies.Y
Nonetheless the Utah Construction dictum has gained respectability and
widespread application, not only in the courts but also as a mainstay of
26
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.
But principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are only one prong
of the administrative preclusion analysis under our system of federalism.
The second prong involves section 1738, the full faith and credit statute.

Section 1738 provides that "[t]he records and judicial proceedings of any
court of any ... State ... shall have the same full faith and credit in

every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in
the courts of such State ... from which they are taken."

27

Whether this

applies to the determinations of state agencies had been one of several
unresolved questions regarding section 1738. The framers of the full faith

and credit clause upon which section 1738 was based,2 and the early

24. Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 422 (citations omitted); see Note, The Collateral Estoppel
Effect of Administrative Agency Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
65, 71 n.57 (1977) (suggesting that the Court purposefully engaged in broader dicta to challenge
statement of Court of Claims that collateral estoppel was applicable only to decisions of
judicial tribunals having authority to find facts and resolve disputes, and that unanimity of
Court's decision adds weight to this dicta).
25. The Court relied on Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co., 310 U.S. at 402 (estopping Sunshine
from relitigating issue it had lost before National Bituminous Coal Commission); Hanover
Bank v. United States, 152 Ct. Cl. 391, 285 F.2d 455, 460 (1961) (affording preclusive effect
to Tax Court determination); Fairmont Aluminum Co. v. Comm'r, 222 F.2d 622, 625-26 (4th
Cir. 1955) (affording preclusive effect to issue resolved by Tax Court); and Seatrain Lines,
Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 207 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1953) (estopping Seatrain from relitigating
issue it had lost before ICC). In all of these cases, the tribunals were federal and the parties
were identical. In fact, only Sunshine and Seatrain involved agency determinations at all, and
the Seatrain court relied as heavily on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it did on
preclusion doctrine. Id. at 259-60.
26. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTs § 83 (1982); see infra note 259 and accompanying
text.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
28. While the legislative history of § 1738 is scant, what does exist suggests that its purpose
was to impose upon federal courts the same obligations to honor the judgments of the several
states as the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution imposes on the states. Article IV
of the Constitution provides: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see Shreve, Preclusion and FederalChoice
of Law, 64 Tax. L. Rv.1209, 1218-19 (1986) (citing Atwood, supra note 12, at 66-67);
Smith, FullFaith and Credit and Section 1983: A Reappraisal,63 N.C.L. REv. 59, 84 (1984);
Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts, 56 MicH. L. REv. 33, 60
n.124 (1957); see also Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483-84 n.24 (1982);
Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1939) ("The Act extended the rule of the Constitution to all
courts, federal as well as state.").
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legislators who drafted the predecessor to section 173829 would have had no
reason to contemplate the application of full faith and credit to agency

determinations.30 Nevertheless, until the Supreme Court decided to the
contrary in University of Tennessee v. Elliott,3' substantial authority existed

to support the application of section 1738 to at least certain agency adju32
dications.
Within the universe of agency-to-court preclusion cases is a subset of
cases in which administrative agency determinations 33 have precluded reli-

tigation of claims or issues raised in federal civil rights litigation. Whatever
the justification for expanding preclusion doctrine to the determinations of
administrative agencies generally, it is the thesis of this Article that courts

29. Section 1738 was originally enacted in 1790 and provided: "And the said records and
judicial proceedings shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court of the United
States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from whence the said records
are, or shall be taken," reprinted in Nadelmann, supra note 28, at 60. It was amended by the
Act of 1804, id. at 61, and then recodified in 1948, id. at 81-82.
30. See University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 795 (1986) ("[B]ecause § 1738
antedates the development of administrative agencies it clearly does not represent a congressional
determination that the decisions of state administrative agencies should not be given preclusive
effect.. .. "); Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 502, 507 (1982) (1871 Congress
did not give thought to administrative agencies). Administrative agencies as we know them
were primarily a creature of the New Deal.
31. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 794. For discussion of this aspect of Elliott, see infra note 132 and
accompanying text.
32. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 444 (1943) (holding that the full
faith and credit clause isapplicable to the determinations of sister states' worker's compensation
boards). Given that § 1738 was modeled on the full faith and credit clause, see supra note
28, many had assumed, prior to the Court's decision to the contrary in Elliott, that § 1738
was to be similarly construed. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 266
n.10 (1980) (assuming application of § 1738 to District of Columbia's consideration of Virginia
state agency determination); 2 AM JUR 2D, Administrative Law § 505 (1962):
The full faith and credit doctrine applies to determinations by administrative
tribunals, and whether the proceeding before the administrative tribunal is regarded as a "judicial proceeding," or its award is a "record" within the meaning
of the full faith and credit clause and the act of Congress, the result is the same.
For judicial proceedings and records of the state are both required to have such
faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they
have by law or usage in the courts of the state from which they are taken.
Id. (citations omitted); Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 229-30 (1969); Bartholomew v. State of New York Ins. Dep't, 469 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983);
Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, The Proper Role of Res Judicata and CollateralEstoppel in
Title VII Suits, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1485, 1520-21 (1981) (§ 1738 purpose and case law supports
conclusion that it applies to administrative determinations, despite literal language); see also
Guild Wineries and Distilleries v. Whitehall Co., 853 F.2d 755, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1988) (extending
full faith and credit to Massachusetts agency determination to same extent it would be accorded
deference in Massachusetts court) (citing Plaine v. McCabe, 797 F.2d 713, 719 (9th Cir. 1986))
("When an administrative proceeding meets the requirements set forth in Utah Construction,
it may rise to the level of a 'judicial proceeding' entitled to preclusive effect by section 1738.").
33. The universe of these agencies may be divided further into those created to enforce
civil rights laws, and those created for entirely different purposes. See infra notes 250-56 and
accompanying text.
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should be more restrained in their liberal application of preclusion doctrine
in civil rights litigation.
Any evaluation of the application of preclusion principles to adjudications

by administrative agencies in subsequent federal civil rights litigation must
include a full appreciation of the functions of administrative agencies and
the relationship between administrative agencies and federal civil rights
enforcement. The Court's use of preclusion to prevent judicial forums from
entertaining federal civil rights claims has frustrated the rationale and
legitimacy of administrative agency adjudications as well as Congress'
purpose in passing the federal civil rights laws.
B.

The Purpose of Agency Adjudications

The term "agency adjudication" has both a narrow and a broad meaning.
Narrowly, it refers to a process that more or less resembles judicial adjudication. This involves "some kind of hearing '3 4 where the parties have
some opportunity to present evidence to a decisionmaker, who then issues
a ruling resolving the dispute. More broadly, however, it refers to just
about all the decisions that agencies make that are not rulemaking.3 5 There
must be, then, a staggering number of adjudications, broadly or narrowly
defined, that occur each year, given the hundreds of thousands of agencies
6
that exist at the federal, state and local level.1
Some of these agencies are in the business of civil rights enforcement.
These, however, are a fraction of the agencies whose decisions may have
an impact on the civil rights of individuals. Such agencies include, for
example, unemployment compensation boards and disciplinary boards that
determine whether an individual was dismissed from employment for cause.
They include school disciplinary boards that determine whether a student
should or should not be suspended or expelled from school. They include
licensing boards that determine whether the license of a professional (or
driver) should be revoked. Not infrequently, in the course of business, such
agencies determine facts relevant to whether an individual was dismissed or
denied a benefit in violation of his or her civil rights.
The creation of agencies, whether to make unemployment compensation
decisions or to enforce the civil rights laws, allows development of expertise
in the agencies' particular fields, and generally, for speedier resolution of

34. See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. Ra. 1267 (1975).
35. See S. BREYER & R. STEwART, ADMInSTRATrvE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 569 (2d
ed. 1985) (adjudication is residual category encompassing all agency dispositions other than
rulemaking); see also Administrative Procedure Act §§ 6-7, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1982).
36. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 35, at 8. See Perschbacher, supra note 13, at
430 & n.44 (quantity of formal adjudications is increasing: 200,000 formal federal administrative
hearings in 1978, compared to 163,200 federal district court cases terminated).
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disputes than would be possible were such matters left to the courts.
However, such expedience is often at the expense of the kind of process
that courts tend to provide. 37 Agency processes are designed generally to be
less formal and more accessible than their judicial counterparts. Such
informality and accessibility facilitates the use of agency processes by those
who lack the sophistication or resources to use judicial processes. But this
ease of access is often offset by the absence of counsel. In many agency
proceedings, especially those concerning civil rights, litigants cannot afford
the expense of legal assistance.
Administrative processes in the federal civil rights field compliment or
reflect congressional encouragement of informal resolution of disputes.
Federal nondiscrimination schemes such as Titles VI and VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, for example, use agencies to enable individuals and
institutions that have discriminated to come into compliance with the civil
rights laws and make appropriate reparations without the necessity of formal
court or administrative proceedings.3" The enforcement scheme under Title
VI requires that when a complaint of discrimination is filed with the federal
funding agency, the agency attempt to achieve voluntary compliance before
taking formal measures. 9 Title VII requires an aggrieved individual to first
attempt state or federal administrative remedies before bringing suit in
federal court, 40 and mandates that agencies attempt to eliminate discrimination through "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persua41
sion.'
Congress designed such measures to supplement, not supplant, judicial
causes of action for redress of civil rights violations. 42 If informal administrative processes fall to resolve the underlying dispute, then an aggrieved
individual has the right to seek redress in federal court. 43 Under Title VI,

37. See infra notes 259-66 and accompanying text.
38. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 482, 499-500 (1987) [hereinafter Informal Procedures].
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982) (no formal enforcement action to be taken until agency
"has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means").
40. See, e.g., Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 523 (1972).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
42. See Silver, Evening the Odds: The Case for Attorneys' Fee Awards for Administrative
Resolution of Title VI and Title VII Disputes, 67 N.C.L. REv. 382, 383 (1989) [hereinafter
Attorneys' Fees] (Congress created both administrative mechanisms and provisions for judicial

redress); see also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975) (Congress
intended victims of employment discrimination to have choice between pursuing Title VII
administrative and § 1981 judicial remedies); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
47-48 (1974) (Congress intended that individuals have right to pursue Title VII remedies in
addition to other state and federal remedies, including arbitration); cf. Resnik, supra note 12,
at 604-05 (Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms were intended as add-ons, not replacements, for judicial processes).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (right to sue under Title VII); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983) (private right of action under Title

VI).
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there is no requirement that an individual first exhaust administrative
remedies, 44 although Congress intended such remedies to play a large part

in Title VI's enforcement. 45 Under Title VII, while there is a requirement
that a complaining party first take her complaint to either the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), or in the case of states that
have such agencies, the state or local fair employment agency, this is only
a preliminary step.4 The complainant's right to subsequently file in federal
court is preserved.47
The bulk of civil rights cases in federal court arise under section 1983
and the other reconstruction era civil rights statutes. 4 Although Congress
has not created any administrative mechanisms for the enforcement of such
rights, many disputes that would otherwise form the basis of successful
section 1983 actions are presented to and resolved by a variety of state and
local agencies. 49 Their resolution at this level rather than through federal
court intervention not only furthers the expedient and inexpensive resolution

of disputes, it also fosters interests of federalism and comity by allowing
state agencies first crack at resolving state law-based disputes.
C.

The Purpose of the Civil Rights Laws

Congress promulgated both the nineteenth century reconstruction era civil
rights laws and modern twentieth century civil rights laws in response to
grave problems of rampant discrimination throughout the nation. Infringement of civil liberties and discrimination based on color, religion, sex,
handicap, and age prompted sweeping legislative responses.50 It was Congress' intent that the courts should liberally construe such laws to effectuate
their remedial purpose.5 '
44. See Attorneys' Fees, supra note 42, at 416.
45. See Informal Procedures,supra note 38, at 499-500.
46. See Mann, Federalism Issues and Title VII: Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., XIII
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 411, 414 (1984-85) (purpose of exhaustion requirement is to
enhance opportunity for amicable settlement of disputes).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O; see Informal Procedures,supra note 38.
48. See Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 641, 658-68 (1987) (suggesting that while exact numbers and percentages are unknowable, the bulk of constitutional tort litigation arises under § 1983 and related reconstruction
era statutes); L. Greenhouse, 1871 Rights Law Now Usedfor Many Causes, N.Y. Times, Aug.
26, 1988, at B6, col. 3 (§ 1983 claims comprise approximately 12% of all civil filings in federal
district courts).
49. See Geetter, Attorney's Fees for § 1983 Claims in Fair Hearings: Rethinking Current
Jurisprudence, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1267, 1273 (1988) (arguing that certain claims raised in
state agency fair hearings provide a basis for § 1983 claims).
50. For brief descriptions of federal civil rights legislation, see T. EIsENBERG, Crv. RiGHTs
LEGISLATIOM: CASEs AND MAT r ,ALs3-7 (2d ed. 1981) and Informal Procedures, supra note
38, at 485-90.
51. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & Aora. NEws 5908, 5910-11 ("In the civil rights area, Congress has instructed
the courts to use the broadest and most effective remedies available to achieve the goals of
our civil rights laws.").
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Nonetheless, while the Court has acknowledged the remedial nature of
the various civil rights laws enacted by Congress, recently its actions in
construing these laws have frequently constricted rather than expanded the
reach, scope and application of civil rights protections.5 2 Obviously, that

such laws are to be liberally construed does not mean that all doubts, no
matter how substantial, are to be resolved in favor of expanding, rather
than limiting civil rights protections. Yet many recent Supreme Court
decisions suggest the reverse: unless Congress has spoken with crystal clarity
on the subject, doubts are to be resolved in favor of the party resisting the
expansion of civil rights protection. In the past decade, the Court has

demonstrated this restrictive approach in its increasing eagerness to apply
preclusion to bar civil rights litigation. Consequently, the remedial intent

of the civil rights laws has been trumped by the Court's expansive application
of preclusion doctrine.

The Court recognized in Monroe v. Pape 3 that a primary purpose behind
Congress' enactment of the reconstruction era civil rights laws was to provide

a federal remedy enforceable in federal court.

4

The Court has held this to

5
be Congress' intent with respect to the 1964 Act and its progeny as well.

52. The Court's decisions in the latter part of the 1988-89 term alone have had a devastating
impact on civil rights enforcement. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct.
2115, 2126 (1989) (in Title VII disparate impact case, plaintiff retains ultimate burden of
proving pretextual nature of employer's asserted business justification); Martin v. Wilks, 109
S. Ct. 2180, 2188 (1989) (white employees not barred from challenging consent decree to which
they were not parties, despite opportunity to intervene, as parties had burden to join them
under Rule 19(a) in order to preclude relitigation); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies Inc., 109
S. Ct. 2261, 2268-69 (1989) (female employees are time-barred under Title VII from challenging
collective bargaining agreement applied in neutral manner, because alleged intentional discrimination occurred when agreement was executed, not when applied adversely to them); Will
v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989) (neither state nor state official
acting in official capacity is "person" within meaning of § 1983); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2372-73 (1989) (racial harassment relating to conditions of employment
not actionable under § 1981 because provision does not apply to conduct occurring after
formation of contract and does not interfere with right to enforce established contract
obligations). For earlier examples, see Informal Procedures,supra note 38, at 536-37 n.327. I
have written elsewhere of the Court's wrongfully restrictive interpretation of the attorneys' fee
provision of § 1988 in regard to administrative resolution of discrimination claims. See generally
Attorneys' Fees, supra note 42.
53. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
54. Id. at 180.
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a
federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect,
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of
citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
Id.
55. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979) (Congress
intended private right of action in federal court under Title IX of the Education Amendments
Act of 1972, as under Title VI of the 1964 Act on which it was modeled); Alexander, 415
U.S. at 48-49 (Congress intended Title VII private action in federal court to supplement, not
supplant, other state and federal remedies).
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Nonetheless, in the past decade, the Court's invocation of preclusion has
56
denied that federal remedy.

II.

A DECADE OF DISSONANCE: THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF
PRECLUSION DOCTRINE IN CIVIL

RIGHTS CASES

In the past decade, the Court has rediscovered section 1738 and common
law preclusion, and compelled neither by prior Court decisions nor by
Congressional pronouncements, expanded their application in a number of
civil rights cases. A concern for crowded court dockets and the institutional
sensitivities of state tribunals, rather than any informed belief that its
approach adequately protects civil rights, appears to have motivated the
Court's expansive use of preclusion. A review of these decisions illustrates
the development of the Court's thinking about the preclusive effect of
administrative determinations, and the analytic distortion in that thinking
that has led the majority of the Court to its present doctrine.
A.

The Section 1983 Cases-State Court-to-FederalCourt
Preclusion Under Section 1738

During the 1980's the Court has expressed increased confidence in state
court adjudications affecting federal rights. The shift actually began a decade
earlier in Younger v. Harris, which forbade federal courts from enjoining
ongoing state criminal proceedings. 57 It evolved in Stone v. Powell, in which
the Court held that federal courts would not grant habeas relief on a fourth
amendment claim which the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate in state court.18 These cases in large measure rejected the widely
held belief that federal forums were necessary for the protection of federal
constitutional rights. 9 The trend continued in Allen v. McCurry60 and Migra
6
v. Warren School District Board of Education. 1
Allen was a section 1983 action filed by Willie McCurry in which he
alleged that the police had violated his constitutional rights when they
searched his home in connection with an arrest. 62 In the criminal proceedings
arising out of that arrest, McCurry had lost a motion to suppress evidence

56. See infra notes 57-155 and accompanying text.
57. 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971). But see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (section 1983
created exception to anti-injunction statute).
58. 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
59. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1977) (criticizing Court's
decision in Powell and its view of parity between state and federal forums as a "dangerous
myth").

60. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
61. 465 U.S. 75 (1984).
62. Allen, 449 U.S. at 92.
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gathered during the allegedly wrongful search.6 3 Because the criminal proceedings had upheld the legality of the search, the district court held that
issue preclusion prevented McCurry from relitigating the legality of the
search in his section 1983 action.64 The court of appeals disagreed. The
court reasoned that because Stone v. Powell prohibited McCurry from
seeking federal habeas review, the section 1983 action was his only route
to a federal forum for adjudication of his federal constitutional claim, and
that such access was critical given "the special role of the federal courts in
protecting civil rights.''65
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. 66 In doing so, it
proclaimed the virtues of res judicata and collateral estoppel in relieving
parties of vexatious litigation, conserving judicial resources, and preventing
inconsistent adjudications. 67 It approvingly noted the doctrine's role in
promoting comity between state and federal courts. 6s Furthermore the Court
interpreted section 1738 to require federal courts to give the same preclusive
69
effect to judgments of state courts as would the courts of those states.
Although it recognized that the principal motivation behind the enactment
of section 1983 was to compensate for the deficiency state courts had
theretofore shown in protecting federal constitutional rights, the Court found
no compelling evidence in either the language of section 1983 or in its
legislative history to suggest that Congress had intended to create an
exception to section 1738.70 "Since repeals by implication are disfavored,"
wrote the majority, "much clearer support than this would be required to
hold that §1738 and the traditional rules of preclusion are not applicable
to § 1983 suits." 7' The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals,

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.at 91.
McCurry v. Allen, 466 F. Supp. 514 (E.D.Mo. 1978).
McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1979).
Allen, 449 U.S. at 105.

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

94.
95-96.
96.
99.

71. Id. (citations omitted). "[T]he Court's view of § 1983 in [Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 174 (1961)] lends no strength to any argument that Congress intended to allow relitigation
of federal issues decided after a full and fair hearing in a state court simply because the state
court's decision may have been erroneous." Id. at 101.
There is, in short, no reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a
person claiming a federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue
already decided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding
in which he would rather not have been engaged at all.
Id. at 104. The majority went on to note some irony in the court of appeals' reliance on
Powell for its decision, "in view of this Court's emphatic reaffirmation in that case of the
constitutional obligation of the state courts to uphold federal law, and its expression of
confidence in their ability to do so." Id. at 105.
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as there had not yet been any determination as to whether all7of the elements

for the proper application of issue preclusion were present. 2

Concerned that the Court was making bad law based on unappealing
73
facts, the dissent acknowledged the important role of preclusion doctrine,
but voiced doubt that a state criminal proceeding would insure that a

defendant-an involuntary participant in such a proceeding-would
have
74
adequate opportunity to have his federal claim adjudicated.
After Allen, it was unclear whether its holding would be limited to issue

75
preclusion. At least two subsequent decisions-Patsyv. Board of Regents,
76
and Haring v. Prosise -supported the view that it might be so limited.
Both of these cases reaffirmed that Congress intended section
1983 to
77
provide a federal forum for the vindication of federal rights.

72. Id. at 105. Thus while the Court generally announced the applicability of § 1738 to
state court determinations in subsequent federal § 1983 litigation, it declined to decide how
that doctrine should apply in the case before it. Id. at 93 n.2, 105 n.25. There were numerous
suggestions in the opinion that because the search had in fact been held partially illegal, and
because the scope of McCurry's civil complaint was less than clear, it might not have been
appropriate to apply preclusion. Id. at 93 n.2.
73. Id. at 106 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 113-16. "A trial court, faced with the decision whether to exclude relevant
evidence, confronts institutional pressures that may cause it to give a different shape to the
Fourth Amendment right from what would result in civil litigation of a damages claim." Id.
at 115. "The criminal defendant is an involuntary litigant in the state tribunal, and against
him all the forces of the State are arrayed. To force him to a choice between forgoing either
a potential defense or a federal forum for hearing his constitutional civil claim is fundamentally
unfair." Id. at 116.
75. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
76. 462 U.S. 306 (1983).
77. In Patsy, the Court reaffirmed earlier precedent that § 1983 did not require exhaustion
of state administrative remedies. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 498. Although careful to state that this
case was not to be treated as one of first impression, the majority nonetheless proceeded to
discuss Congress' intent in promulgating § 1983. Id. at 500-07. It frankly acknowledged that
Congress gave no thought whatsoever to the question of exhaustion; hardly surprising, since
state administrative agencies did not exist in any relevant number in 1871 when the Act was
promulgated. Id. at 502, 507. The majority nonetheless concluded that an exhaustion requirement was inconsistent with Congress' desire to provide a federal forum for the vindication of
federal rights. Id. at 505. In so deciding, the Court reaffirmed that congressional intent, and
not the Court's current view of the state of state-federal relations, should govern its decision.
Id. at 512; see also Smith, supra note 28, at 109 (arguing that the same approach should hold
true in the Court's approach to preclusion doctrine).
The next year the Court decided Haring, 462 U.S. at 306, a preclusion case. Haring asked
whether a § 1983 plaintiff's guilty plea barred his relitigation of the legality of the search that
led to his indictment and plea. Id. at 308. The Court unanimously rejected the petitioners'
arguments that Allen controlled, id. at 313, that Virginia would have barred a civil action
litigating the validity of the search, id. at 316-17, and that the Court should fashion a federal
common law rule of preclusion barring the civil claim after a guilty plea, id. at 318. The
Court stressed that Prosise's guilty plea was in no measure an adjudication of the legality of
the search. Id. at 316. And, once again, the Court reiterated that "[a]doption of petitioners'
rule of preclusion would threaten important interests in preserving federal courts as an available
forum for the vindication of constitutional rights." Id. at 322. But see Walker v. Schaeffer,
854 F.2d 138, 143 (6th Cir. 1988) (nolo contendere plea collaterally estops relitigation of
probable cause to arrest).
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Yet the Court's decision in Migra v. Warren School District Board of
Education 8 soon dashed any hopes that the Court was returning generally
to a conviction that federal forums were critical for vindication of section
1983 rights. Plaintiff, an elementary education supervisor, prevailed in a
state court action against her employer on a breach of contract claim. 79 She
subsequently brought a federal action under sections 1983, 1985, and various
provisions of the Constitution alleging that defendants had deprived her of
her first amendment rights.8 0 The entire Court agreed that resolution of this
matter was controlled if not by the decision itself,8' by the analysis in Allen:
Federal courts were bound by section 1738 to apply the preclusion rules of
the state that rendered the initial judgment.8 2 "It is difficult to see," wrote
the majority, "how the policy concerns underlying section 1983 would
justify a distinction between the issue preclusive and claim preclusive effects
of state-court judgments. ' 8 3 Rejecting plaintiff's argument that distinguishing between issue and claim preclusion would enable litigants to bring their
state claims in state court and their federal claims in federal court, and so
further the interests of federalism and comity, the Court stated that such
4
"is not the system established by section 1738."1
The path the Court followed in Allen and Migra was not an inevitable
one. The Court might well have found an exception to section 1738 in the
broad remedial scheme created by section 1983.85 Its refusal to do so is
consistent with its increasing concern with docket congestion and decreasing
concern with effective civil rights enforcement. The point of departure is
the Court's insistence that it is no longer the case that state courts are less

78. 465 U.S. at 75.
79. Id. at 78-79.
80. Id. at 79-80.
81. Id. at 83 ("The Court in Allen left open the possibility . . . that the preclusive effect
of a state-court judgment might be different as to a federal issue that a § 1983 litigant could
have raised but did not raise in the earlier state-court proceeding.").
82. Id. at 83-85.
83. Id.at 83.
84. Id. at 84. The majority in fact finds this a less sympathetic claim than that of the
plaintiff in Allen, since Migra could have first gone to federal court had she chosen to do so.
Id. at 85 n.7.
85. See Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem,
70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 859, 866-75 (1976) (arguing congressional intent that § 1983 should be
exception to general rules of preclusion and § 1738); see also Smith, supra note 28, at 110-19
(advocating multi-step process for determining whether to apply preclusion in § 1983 cases).
It bears observation that even if the Court was "wrong" in Allen and Migra in finding that
§ 1738 applied to § 1983 actions, nothing "precludes" Congress from correcting the Court's
error. Congress' failure to do so may or may not be evidence that the Court was "right." It
is interesting to note that after the Court decided in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) that
a state court determination on a federal constitutional claim did not bar a federal habeas
claim (although the Court never even mentioned full faith and credit nor § 1738), Congress
amended the habeas statute to make such an exception explicit. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982);
see Atwood, supra note 12, at 73.
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able to effectively protect federal constitutional rights than are their federal
counterparts . 6 There is widespread disagreement with this premise.8 7 Even
if the Court's position has merit as far as state courts are concerned, placing
similar confidence in the adjudications made by state agencies is alarmingly
misguided.

B.

Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.8 -Limited State Court
Review of Agency Determination-to-FederalCourt Preclusion
Under Title VII and Section 1738

Unlike section 1983, Title VII creates a scheme which requires a complaining party to give a state or federal agency an opportunity to resolve
86. See, e.g., Powell, 428 U.S. at 494 n.35 ("[W]e are unwilling to assume that there now
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate
courts of the several States."). Compare Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U.
Cm. L. R v. 317, 319-20 (1978) (arguing that state courts can adequately protect federal
rights, as manifest in the Younger doctrine) with Theis, supra note 85, at 869 ("That conditions
leading to the passage of the 1871 Act have changed considerably is no doubt an accurate
judgment, although perhaps one for Congress to make if it is to serve as the basis for any
shift in policy."). See also Currie, supra, at 328 ("No language in section 1983 remotely
suggests any modification of res judicata ....
The argument based upon Congress' perception
of state court inadequacy would logically destroy section 1738 altogether. All grants of federal
jurisdiction are based upon some perceived inadequacy of state courts.").
Recently, in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), the Court struck down the application
of Wisconsin's notice of claim statute to a § 1983 claim filed in state court. Id. at 134. Justice
Brennan, writing the 7-2 opinion, held that the notice requirement, by imposing an exhaustion
condition, was inconsistent with the Court's decision in Patsy. Id. at 146-50. He further
rejected the state's argument that the notice requirement gives government defendants an

opportunity to settle:
First, it ignores our prior assessment of "the dominant characteristic of civil
rights actions: they belong in court." Burnett, 468 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added).
"These causes of actions ... exist independent of any other legal or administrative
relief that may be available as a matter of federal or state law. They are judicially
enforceable in the first instance." Ibid. (emphasis added).
Felder, 487 U.S. at 148. Felder was not a preclusion case. Instead, the Court engaged in a
reverse-Erietype of analysis. Felder, 487 U.S. at 151-52. And none of the opinions draw any
analogy or make any distinctions between that case and Elliott, Allen or Migra. It is somewhat
ironic that a majority of the Court should find a notice-of-claim statute, which only applies
when a § 1983 plaintiff chooses to file his action in state rather than federal court, to create
an unacceptable burden on the assertion of a federal right, given its decisions in the preclusion
cases involving assertion of § 1983 rights. Compare Felder, 487 U.S. at 150-51 (majority's
rejection of argument that those who choose to bring their federal claims in state court do so
aware of the state's procedural requirements, because states can't unnecessarily burden the
exercise of federal rights) with Felder, 487 U.S. at 160-61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting with
Rehnquist, C.J.) (arguing that since every plaintiff has option of proceeding in federal or state
court "the Wisconsin statute 'discriminates' only against a right that Congress has never
created: the right of a plaintiff to have the benefit of selected federal court procedures after
the plaintiff has rejected the federal forum and chosen a state forum instead").
87. Professor Neuborne, for example, has persuasively argued that the Court's confidence
is misplaced, dangerously based on a "myth of parity"; that for a variety of reasons there is
no parity between state and federal courts' ability to protect federal constitutional rights.
Neuborne, supra note 59; see also Shreve, Letting Go of the Eleventh Amendment, 64 IND.
L.J. 601, 604-05 (1989) (describing debate among scholars as to whether state courts are as
competent or less competent than federal courts in applying federal law).
88. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
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his complaint before he may file suit in federal court.8 9 Rubin Kremer, who
believed his employer had discriminated against him because he was a Jew, 9°
filed a complaint with the EEOC, which the EEOC then referred to the
appropriate state agency, the New York State Division of Human Rights
(NYHRD). 91 The NYHRD found no probable cause, a determination the
Appeal Board then affirmed. 92 Kremer returned to the EEOC,9 a and, pursuant to the notification he had received from the Appeal Board, 91 also
filed a petition for review with the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court. 95 On February 27, 1978, that court affirmed the Appeal
Board's order. 96 Thereafter, the EEOC agreed there was no probable cause,
and issued Kremer a right-to-sue notice enabling him to proceed to federal
court on his Title VII claim. 97 Bound by a decision of the Second Circuit
issued while Kremer was pending, 98 the district court reluctantly granted
defendant's motion to dismiss based on res judicata.99 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari from the Second Circuit's affirmance of that decision, 1' °
and, in a 5-4 split, affirmed.' 0'
As with Allen, and subsequently Migra, the majority found section 1738
controlling; the federal court was bound to accord the same preclusive
effect to the Appellate Division's ruling as another New York court would
have done. 0 2 The Court concluded that a state court, bound by New York's
Executive Law, 103 would have barred Kremer from bringing any further
action on the same claim. 1°4 The majority reasoned that Title VII's exhaus-

89. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
90. Kremer alleged some additional bases of discrimination. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 463, 464
n.2.
91. Id. at 463-64.
92. Id. at 464.
93. Id.
94. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 787 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456 U.S.
461 (1982).
95. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 464.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 465.
98. Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 601 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979)
(Article 78 review precluded subsequent Title VII claim); see also Mitchell v. National
Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977) (Article 78 review precluded subsequent § 1981
claim).
99. 477 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). "To submit to Mitchell and Sinicropi, however, is
not to agree with them. The Mitchell majority's conclusion that Title VII's de novo review is
satisfied by a combination of an agency finding of no probable cause coupled with Article 78
review seems fanciful." Id. at 591.
100. Kremer, 623 F.2d at 786.
101. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466.
102. Id. at 468.
103. N.Y. Exac. LAW § 300 (McKinney 1972) (where an individual chooses to resort to
agency procedures for adjudication of a claim, "the final determination therein shall exclude
any other action, civil or criminal, based on the same grievance of the individual concerned").
104. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466-67.
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tion requirements did not require Kremer to seek state court review; but
once he had, he was bound by the res judicata consequences of the state
court's decision. 05 The Court limited its holding to the facts presented, and

suggested in a footnote that the same analysis would not apply under Title
VII to an unreviewed state agency determination.'16 As it had held regarding

section 1983, the Court found Congress had no intention of creating an
exception to section 1738 by passing Title VII. The Court held that preclusion applied even though the state court judgment was one of limited review

of an investigatory agency determination rather than a full adjudicatory
proceeding. 0 7
The dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Title VII's
statutory language and legislative history, 08 and questioned the Court's
understanding of the limited nature of the state court's review.' °9 It argued

105. Id. at 469-70.
106. Id. at 470 n.7 ("[I]t is clear that unreviewed administrative determinations by state
agencies also should not preclude such review even if such a decision were to be afforded
preclusive effect in a State's own courts."). But see id. at 484 n.26:
Certainly, the administrative nature of the factfinding process is not dispositive.
In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966), we
held that, so long as opposing parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate
disputed issues of fact, res judicata is properly applied to decisions of an
administrative agency acting in a "judicial capacity."
Id. (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 481 ("[Flor present purposes, where we are bound by the statutory directive of
§ 1738, state proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and
credit guaranteed by federal law."); id. at 483 ("We have little doubt that Kremer received
all the process that was constitutionally required in rejecting his claim that he had been
discriminatorily discharged contrary to the statute."). In fact, the state agency determination
was made after investigation only, with no adversarial hearing. Id. at 464.
The Court was unimpressed with Kremer's argument that its holding would deter litigants
from seeking state court review of adverse administrative determinations. Id. at 478. Rather,
the Court found that "[d]epriving state judgments of finality not only would violate basic
tenets of comity and federalism but also would reduce the incentive for States to work towards
effective and meaningful antidiscrimination systems." Id. (citation omitted). It further failed
to address the anomalous result of its decision that despite Congress' intended deference to
state procedures in Title VII, only the person who exhausts a little of the state procedures will
have access to a federal forum, but one who follows through to completion will be barred
from federal court. Id. at 504-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 488 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[I]f in 1972 Congress had intended final
decisions in state 'proceedings' to have preclusive effect, it certainly would not have instructed
that they be given 'substantial weight.' "); see also id. at 511:
Both the text of Title VII and its legislative history indicate that Congress
intended the claimant to have at least one opportunity to prove his case in a de
novo trial in court. Thus, while I agree with the Court that Title VII did not
impliedly repeal § 1738, I cannot accept the Court's construction of § 1738 in
this case [in which Kremer had no de novo hearing in either state or federal
court].
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 488-93. "[Allthough it claims to grant a state court preclusive effect, in fact the
Court bars petitioner's suit based on the state agency's decision of no probable cause." Id.
at 492-93.
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that the majority had the comity issue backwards: cutting off access to a
federal forum for a Title VII claim once a party has obtained state court

review would result in fewer Title VII complainants seeking state court
review." 0 "It is a perverse sort of comity that eliminates the reviewing
function of state courts in the name of giving their decisions due respect."'

Given the Court's formalistic approach to section 1738, the result in

Kremer is not surprising." 2 It is nonetheless distressing. Mr. Kremer, without

benefit of counsel," 3 went through the procedures he was told to go through,

and then found himself barred from the federal courthouse." 4 He never
had any adversarial testing of his complaint. Perhaps his complaint was

meritless; perhaps it was not.'

5

If not for his mistake in seeking routine

state court review of the routine state administrative determination, he
would have had the right to test his complaint in federal court, a right
Congress provided him in Title VII.116 Kremer made a choice perhaps, but
7
not an informed one."
No conceivable reason exists for having a scheme which requires com-

plainants to first pursue state administrative remedies and then forecloses

federal remedies should they seek all available state review of the agency
determination. Moreover, the Court's analysis in Kremer would suggestas some courts have subsequently held-that employers might insure that

complainants are barred from pursuing a Title VII claim in federal court
in those instances in which the complainant prevails at the administrative
level by successfully seeking state court review and reversal.' 18 And as for
I10. Id. at 504.
111. Id. at 505.
112. Interestingly, however, the Court never discusses, nor even notes, the inconsistency
between its slavish adherence to § 1738 in these cases, and its decision in New York Gaslight
Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980), holding that a federal court had jurisdiction under
Title VII to award attorney's fees to a plaintiff who had prevailed in related (New York) state
proceedings. Id. at 61; see Mann, supra note 46, at 426. While the cases might be distinguished
by issue and claim preclusion, the Court's § 1738 analysis suggests there should be no difference,
and the Court's subsequent decision in Migra seems to confirm this.
113. See Mann, supra note 46, at 426.
114. See Kremer, 477 F. Supp. at 593 n.10.
The unfairness of applying Sinicropi to plaintiffs such as Mr. Kremer was brought
home to this court when Mr. Kremer was told his complaint had to be dismissed.
He was obviously shocked to discover that he had no right to federal review.
He complained that he had gone through all the procedures he had been told to
go through, but had never obtained a hearing on his claim.
Id.
115. While the Court certainly never says that it is influenced by his having lost at every
administrative and state court level, one wonders whether this particular fact pattern helped
make bad law; cf. Resnik, supra note 12, at 615-16 (Court's preclusion decisions not explained
by belief that initial determinations were "correct").
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
117. Kremer, 623 F.2d at 787.
118. See Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 172-76 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying
Kremer rationale to state court reversal of finding of discrimination in subsequent § 1981
action). Davis and the issue of voluntary vs. involuntary litigants are discussed infra notes
228-49 and accompanying text.
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the informed civil rights complainant who loses at the state administrative
proceeding, the lesson of Kremer is that he better stop short of the state
courthouse door if he wishes to have his day in federal court. 19 The absence

of state court review was a necessary condition to avoiding preclusion under
Kremer. It did not turn out, however, to be sufficient.
2 0-Unreviewed State
C. University of Tennessee v. Elliott1
Agency-to-Federal Court Preclusion Under Title VII and Section
1983

In 1981 University officials notified Robert E. Elliott that he would be
dismissed from his position in the Agricultural Extension Service for inadequate job performance and misconduct.' 2' Elliott challenged his dismissal
through the state's administrative machinery, and also filed a federal law
suit alleging that he was being discriminated against because he was black

in violation of both Title VII and the reconstruction era civil rights laws.'2
The state agency, after a hearing held before an assistant to one of the
named defendants in the federal suit,'23 sustained several of the University's
charges, and found that Elliott had failed to demonstrate that the actions

taken against him were racially motivated.' 4 Rather than seek state court
review of this determination, Elliott returned to federal court. 25 The district
court granted the University's motion for summary judgment, holding that
Elliott was not entitled to relitigate the issue of racial animus in federal
Court. 12

The court of appeals reversed. 2 7 Relying on Kremer, it held that an
unreviewed state agency determination could not preclude relitigation of a
Title VII claim.'2 As to the Reconstruction Act claims, it held that section
1738 was inapplicable, and it declined to fashion a federal common law

119. In fact, plaintiff better not go near the courthouse door. See Bray v. New York Life
Ins., 851 F.2d 60, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding plaintiff's federal Title VII action precluded
by state court's dismissal of action to review administrative determination because of statute
of limitations and improper service, when New York court would afford such dismissal res
judicata effect).
120. 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
121. Id. at 790.
122. Id. at 790-91.
123. The administrative assistant to the University's Vice President for Agriculture presided
as an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Id. at 791.
124. Id. at 791-92. However, the ALJ concluded that discharge of Elliott was too severe a
penalty for the conduct and instead ordered Elliott transferred to a new assignment with new
supervisors. Id. at 791.
125. Id. at 792.
126. Id.
127. Elliott v. University of Tenn., 766 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1985), modified, 478 U.S. 788
(1986).
128. Id. at 989.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:367

rule of preclusion because, among other reasons, to do so would be
incompatible with Congress' purpose
in creating a federal forum for the
129
adjudication of federal rights.

The Supreme Court, in a suprisingly terse 5-3 opinion, 130 agreed with the
court of appeals on the Title VII claim, and on its interpretation of section
1738.131 The majority began its discussion by declaring, unsupported by any
citation, that section 1738 governs only "the preclusive effect to be given

the judgments and records of state courts, and is not applicable to the
unreviewed state administrative factfinding at issue in this case." 32 However,
said the majority, federal courts are nonetheless free to fashion a common
law rule of preclusion in the absence of a governing statute. 33 As to the
Title VII claim, the Court agreed it would be inappropriate to fashion such
a rule as the language of Title VII itself was inconsistent with affording
34
preclusive effect to an unreviewed state agency finding on discrimination.

3
Furthermore, the Court had previously held in Chandler v. Roudebush
that Congress intended the Title VII claimant to have a de novo trial in
federal court, regardless of any administrative finding.

129. Id. at 990-93.
130. Justice Marshall did not participate. See Elliott, 478 U.S. at 799. Justice Stevens, joined
by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concurred as to the resolution of the Title VII claim, and
the inapplicability of § 1738, but dissented as to the Court's resolution of the other civil rights
claims. Id. at 799-803.
131. Id. at 794-96.
132. Id. at 794; see discussion supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text as to whether the
full faith and credit clause or § 1738 applies to the determinations of state agencies. Elliott
does acknowledge Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980):
Significantly, all of the opinions in [Thomas] express the view that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause compels the States to give preclusive effect to the factfindings
of an administrative tribunal in a sister State. . . . The Full Faith and Credit
Clause is of course not binding on federal courts, but we can certainly look to
the policies underlying the Clause in fashioning federal common-law rules of
preclusion.
Elliott, 478 U.S. at 798-99. Thomas, however, involved Virginia and the District of Columbia,
and discussed § 1738, as well as the full faith and credit clause, as relevant to the preclusion
inquiry. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 261, 266 & n.10.
133. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 797. The Court noted that since § 1738 antedated the development
of administrative agencies, it could not be considered any kind of congressional disapproval
of such a rule. Id.
134. Id. at 795.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), the [EEOC], in investigating discrimination
charges, must give "substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State
or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local [employment
discrimination] law." . . . [Ilt would make little sense for Congress to write such
a provision if state agency findings were entitled to preclusive effect in Title VII
actions in federal court.
Id. But see Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 32, at 1505-06 (arguing that Title VII
requires that at least substantial weight be given to state agency's investigative determination,
but that it is consistent with giving more weight, even preclusive effect, to state agency
determination rendered after full opportunity for hearing).
135. 425 U.S. 840, 848 (1976).
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But the majority found no similar difficulty in applying preclusion to the
other civil rights claims. It read the Court's decisions in Allen and Migra
broadly: nothing in the legislative history of section 1983 suggested "that
Congress intended to repeal or restrict the traditional doctrines of preclusion."' 36 And, despite its acknowledgement that the 1871 Congress could
not foresee the development of administrative agencies, the majority saw
"no reason to suppose that Congress, in enacting the reconstruction civil
rights statutes, wished to foreclose the adaptation of traditional principles
of preclusion to such subsequent developments as the burgeoning use of
administrative adjudication in the 20th century.' 3 7 Relying on United States
v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 3 the Court held that when an
administrative agency acts "in a judicial capacity ... [and] resolves disputed
issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate
opportunity to litigate," federal courts should give the agency's determinations the same preclusive effect they would receive in the state's own
courts. 39 However, as no court had determined whether Elliott's
adminis140
trative hearing met that test, the Court remanded the case.
It is difficult if not impossible to reconcile the reasoning of the Court in
Elliott regarding the reconstruction era claims with its reasoning two years
earlier in McDonald v. City of West Branch.' 4 In McDonald, a discharged
police officer filed a grievance pursuant to his union's collective bargaining
agreement. The grievance eventually proceeded to arbitration, and the
arbitrator ruled that the employer, the City of West Branch, had just cause
for dismissing McDonald. McDonald then filed a section 1983 claim alleging
that he was discharged for exercising his first amendment rights. 42 The
Supreme Court rejected arguments that section 1738 barred relitigation of
the reason for discharge, and refused to fashion a common law rule of
preclusion. 43 The Court cited its refusal to do so in prior cases involving
arbitration, one involving Title VII, the other the Fair Labor Standards
Act.'" The Court said that its refusal to apply preclusion in those cases

136. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 797 (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1980)).
137. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 797.
138. 384 U.S. at 394.
139. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 797-98 (quoting Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 422). In Elliott, as in
Kremer, the Court misread the holding of Utah Construction. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 48485 n.26 ("In [Utah Construction], we held that, so long as opposing parties had an adequate
opportunity to litigate disputed issues of fact, res judicata is properly applied to decisions of
an administrative agency acting in a 'judicial capacity.' "). See discussion of Utah Constr.,
supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
140. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 799 n.8.
141. 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (no preclusion afforded to arbitration determination in subsequent
§ 1983 case).
142. Id. at 285-86.
143. Id. at 287-89.
144. Id. at 288-89 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (no preclusion
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was "based in large part on our conclusion that Congress intended the
statutes at issue ... to be judicially enforceable and that arbitration could

not provide an adequate substitute for judicial proceedings in adjudicating
claims under those statutes.' ' 45 While the Court acknowledged the suitability
of arbitration in resolving certain claims, like contract disputes,146 it reaffirmed its prior holdings that arbitration could not "provide an adequate
substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and
constitutional rights that § 1983 is designed to safeguard."' 47 Thus the Court

refused to apply preclusion to an arbitration decision to bar either a Title
VII or a section 1983 claim.
48
The Elliott Court failed to discuss the civil rights arbitration cases1
Certainly there are distinctions between arbitration proceedings and many

judicial-like agency proceedings that may have some relevance to their respective abilities to protect federal constitutional and statutory rights.1 49 However,
it is nonetheless remarkable that the Court in Elliott made no attempt to
demonstrate either that agency proceedings offer more civil rights protection
than arbitration proceedings, or that agency proceedings are the procedural
equivalent of judicial proceedings. In contrast, the civil rights arbitration cases
demonstrate the important differences between arbitral and judicial processes, 50

attaches to arbitration in subsequent Title VII litigation); Barreritine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (no preclusive effect of arbitration on a subsequent Fair Labor
Standards Act claim)).
145. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 290-91; see Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (upholding
binding arbitration under Arbitration Act for federal securities claims prior to adjudication of
joined state law claims, and declining to decide preclusion question); Thomas, 448 U.S. at 296
n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Arbitration awards ... have traditionally been afforded full
faith and credit."); Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352 (l1th Cir.
1985) (requiring preclusion based on prior arbitration decision in RICO claim); see also Shell,
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. Rav.
623, 673-75 (1988) (arguing that arbitral preclusion should be determined through application
of contract law principles rather than application of law of judgments).
147. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290; see also Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc.,
858 F.2d 1304, 1306 (8th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing federal policy in arbitration of commercial
disputes and civil rights claims); Coppinger v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 861 F.2d 33 (2d
Cir. 1988) (binding arbitration under Railway Labor Act not preclusive on subsequent fourth
amendment claim brought under § 1983).
148. The Elliott majority makes only passing reference to Alexander regarding the irrelevance
of plaintiff's voluntary choice of the administrative forum. See Elliott, 478 U.S. at 796 n.5.
149. For example, whereas the purpose of administrative proceedings may be to implement
a statutory scheme protecting public rights, such as Title VII, arbitration proceedings exist
largely to resolve disputes arising out of private bargains. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 53
(arbitrator "has no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain
between the parties"); Shell, supra note 146, at 634 (arbitration system frequently encourages
arbitrator to "split the difference between the parties").
150. But see Owens v. Texaco, 857 F.2d 262, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1988) (district court precluded
from relitigating arbitrator's interpretation of collective bargaining agreement and should have
considered arbitrator's finding of no racial discrimination).
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and offer no basis for distinguishing between section 1983 and Title VII claims
15
in the preclusion analysis. '
If all the Court was saying in Elliott was that a federal court shall apply
the state's preclusion rule if the agency proceeding is truly like a judicial
proceeding, then the decision would be of largely theoretical interest, as
agency proceedings will rarely be procedurally equivalent to judicial proceedings. This analysis appears unlikely, however, given the Court's apparent
willingness, as in Elliott, to borrow from section 1738 jurisprudence in
fashioning its own common law rules of preclusion.l5 2 Thus the Court's
analysis in Kremer-thatthe agency proceedings must merely meet minimum
due process standards for section 1738 to require preclusion' 53-may well
shape the Court's view of procedural sufficiency or equivalency even when
the Court is applying not section 1738 but general rules of preclusion. If
so, then the Court's stated test in Elliott-that the state's own preclusion
rules regarding unreviewed state agency determinations will apply when the
state has acted "in a judicial capacity" and resolved factual disputes which
the parties "had an adequate opportunity to litigate"' 54-will, in many
instances, result in the loose and inappropriate application of preclusion
55
principles to unreviewed state agency determinations.

D.

The Title VII/Section 1983 Dichotomy

Another unfortunate result of the Court's decision in Elliott is that in
the numerous cases that join Title VII and section 1983 claims, 5 6 adminis-

151. See, e.g., Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56-58; McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290-92.
152. See, e.g., Elliott, 478 U.S. at 797 ("The Court's discussion in Allen suggests that it
would have reached the same result even in the absence of § 1738.").
153. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481.
154. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 799 (quoting Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 422).
155. The Court recently declined an opportunity to further define what would constitute a
"full and fair opportunity to litigate." See Nelson v. Jefferson County, Ky., 863 F.2d 18 (6th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 76 (1989). The question presented in Nelson was: What
are minimally acceptable standards for federal courts that must attempt to apply state preclusion
law in determining whether or not to dismiss federal constitutional claims prosecuted pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. 1983 under rules set forth in Migra and Elliott?
156. See Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of
the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 719, 724
(1988) ("Many constitutional tort cases are employment discrimination claims against a
government that also include a title VII allegation."). While the Supreme Court has held that
preemption is inapplicable to a suit joining claims under § 1981 and Title VII, Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975), it has also held that Title VII cannot form
the basis for a separate conspiracy charge under § 1985, Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 376-77 (1979). The Court has yet to rule explicitly on whether Title
VII preempts actions under § 1983. See id. at 377 n.21 (distinguishing legislative intent behind
§§ 1981 and 1983 from that of § 1985). For an argument that Title VII should not preclude
related § 1983 actions, see Levit, Preemption of Section 1983 by Title VII: An Unwarranted
Deprivation of Remedies, 15 HoFs.A L. REv. 265 (1987).
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trative preclusion will apply to the latter, but not to the former. 5 7 The
post-Elliott decision in Long v. Laramie County'58 is a striking example of
the fruits of this distorted approach to preclusion.
Sharioi Long claimed that Rodney Southworth, her supervisor at Laramie
County Community College, had sexually harassed her. 5 9 A College Grievance Committee heard eighteen hours of testimony and entered findings
that the College's Board of Trustees subsequently adopted. 6° The Board
found that Southworth had sexually harassed Long, that Long complained
to other officials at the college about Southworth's harassment, and that,
as a consequence the college retaliated against he" by not renewing her
employment contract.' 6' The Board ordered the college to reinstate Long in
an appropriate position and pay her back wages of $4,080.00 plus attorneys'
fees.1 61 After further difficulties with the college, Long filed charges with
the Office for Civil Rights which found that the school had retaliated for
her efforts on behalf of sexually harassed female students. She also filed
with the EEOC which found probable cause to believe she had been
discriminated against through sexual harassment, and issued a notice of
63
right to sue.
Long then instituted an action in federal district court under Title VII
and sections 1983 and 1985.'6 With the agreement of the parties, the trial
judge bifurcated the trial of the Title VII claim from the sections 1983 and
1985 claims and first held a bench trial on the Title VII claims.' 65 After
trial, the court rejected Long's claims, finding she "had failed to establish
a prima facie case of sex discrimination because she had failed to prove
that Southworth had sexually harassed her or that the college or the

157. The Court's lack of concern with consistency in its various civil rights preclusion cases
is interesting given frequent congressional and judicial attempts at consistency in other areas
of civil rights enforcement. See, e.g., Attorneys' Fees, supra note 42, at 405-06 (Courts show
deference to Congress' desire for consistent application of the civil rights attorneys' fees
statutes.). Lower courts have split as to whether claims arising under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act are to be treated the same as Title VII claims for purposes of preclusion.
Compare Duggan v. Board of Educ. of Chicago Heights, 818 F.2d 1291, 1297 (7th Cir. 1987);
Delgado v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 815 F.2d 641, 646 (11th Cir. 1987) and Rosenfeld v.
Department of the Army, 769 F.2d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 1985) (same as Title VII) with Stillians
v. Iowa, 843 F.2d 276, 282 (8th Cir. 1988) and Mack v. South Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d
1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1986) (preclusion applicable). See also Note, Administrative Res Judicata
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 1111 (1989) (Age
Discrimination Act claims, like Title VII claims, should not be precluded based on unreviewed
state agency determinations.).
158. 840 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 73 (1988).
159. Id. at 745-46.
160. Id. at 746-47.
161. Id.at 747.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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individual defendants had retaliated against her."'

6

The court accepted the

defendants' explanations of their failure to reemploy Long, finding them

not to be pretextual1 67 Because the proceeding was de novo, the court did
not consider itself bound by the findings of the Grievance Committee, the
Board of Trustees, the OCR, or the EEOC, and believed all those findings
to be based on Long's unsubstantiated and uncorroborated version of the

facts.

68

Furthermore, the judge found Long's credibility to be highly ques-

tionable. 16 9 The court subsequently granted defendants' motion for summary

judgment on the sections 1983 and 1985 claims, 70based on the issue preclusive
effect of his decision on the Title VII claims.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision on the Title VII
claim, but reversed, on the basis of Elliott, its disposition of the Reconstruction Act claims.' 7' Convinced that the state agency proceedings met the Utah
Construction test, the court of appeals believed that despite its finding on
the Title VII claim, the district court was required by Elliott to give the
same preclusive effect to the Board's determination as would the Wyoming

courts. 72 The appellate court noted in passing that Justice Stevens' dissent
7
in Elliott had remarked upon the incongruity of this result.' "
Although this is not the first time that res judicata principles have
produced strange results,

74

the Title VII/section 1983 dichotomy in Long

is bizarre, unnecessary and does not flow from any obvious tactical error
made by the party resisting preclusion. 1 7 If a primary purpose of fashioning

a rule of preclusion is to avoid relitigation and redundancy, then this rule
fails miserably, given the frequent joinder of Title VII with other claims
arising under the antidiscrimination laws. 176 Sexual harassment of a state
166. Id. at 748.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. A collateral issue in this case was the surprise testimony offered by the defendants
of Long's former husband, who she apparently believed to be dead until he walked into the
courtroom as the defense's first witness and testified that Long had spent time in a mental
institution and had a poor reputation for truthfulness. Id. at 748; Conversation between
Marjorie A. Silver and Richard C. LaFond, attorney for Sharon Long (July 7, 1988). Although
the court of appeals found that defendants had clearly violated the rules of discovery and the
pre-trial order by not informing Long of their intention to call the former husband as a
witness, it refused to find that the trial judge had abused his discretion by allowing the
testimony. Long, 840 F.2d at 749-50.
170. Long, 840 F.2d at 749-50.
171. Id.at 749, 751.
172. Id.at 751. The court of appeals concluded, albeit without much analysis, that the
Wyoming courts would give preclusive effect to the findings of the Board. Id.at 752.
173. Id. at 751 n.3 (citing Elliott, 478 U.S. at 800 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
174. See, e.g., Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 198 (1932) (failure to appeal from adverse
determination in ejectment action meant party who had established entitlement to bequest of
property could retain rents, but forfeited title).
175. See id.
176. See Catania, Access to the Federal Courtsfor Title VII Claimants in the Post-Kremer
Era: Keeping the Door Open, 16 Loy. U. Cm.L.J. 209, 228 n.86 (1985). Title VII claims
may of course also be joined with other kinds of claims.
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employee violates Title VII as well as section 1983. Nonetheless, under the
Long court's seemingly inevitable interpretation of Elliott, Long won on
1
her section 1983 claim, and lost on her Title VII claim. 77
The absurdity of this result may go further. Under Title VII, a party
must first submit her dispute to a designated state fair employment agency,

if one exists, before filing suit. Elliott may require that any determination
of an issue of fact made in an adjudicatory hearing before such a state
agency may not be binding on a subsequent Title VII claim filed in federal
court, but must be binding on a joined section 1983 claim.
III.

THE VARIABLES IN ADMINISTRATIVE PRECLUSION ANALYSIS

In a sense, Elliott posed a simplistic solution to a complex problem:
federal courts should apply the state's preclusion law unless to do so would

be inconsistent with a federal statute, or violate fundamental notions of
due process. But application of this rule reveals that its simplicity is

chimerical, for the variables are complex and numerous. Whether preclusion
is consistent with a federal statute, for instance, is not always easy to
discern, especially when Congress apparently gave no thought to the preclusion issue. Whether the parties have received the process that was their

due is frequently in the eyes of the beholding court. Further, the joinder
of precluded and non-precluded claims can yield bizarre results, as in Long.
These and other variables with which the lower courts continue to struggle
have produced a crazy quilt of administrative preclusion doctrine, both of

reviewed and unreviewed agency determinations. This Part identifies and
explores a number of these variables. The problems raised underscore the

inadequacy of the Court's approach to the doctrine of administrative
preclusion, and the need for a coherent solution to the treatment of
administrative determinations in federal civil rights litigation.

177. But the conclusion of the district and circuit courts that Title VII forbade giving
preclusive effect to the state agency's determination in Long is not forgone. All of the Supreme
Court cases that have spoken to the Title VII preclusion question in regards to unreviewed
state agency determinations have focused on Congress' intent to grant employees a right to
trial de novo on their Title VII claims; none of the opinions addressed a case such as Long
where the employee, rather than the employer, had prevailed below. See Elliott, 478 U.S. at
795-96 ("[Olur decision in Chandler v. Roudebush ... strongly supports respondent's contention that Congress intended one in his position to have a trial de novo on his Title VII claim."
(emphasis added)); Chandler, 425 U.S. at 844 ("It is well established that § 706 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 accords private-sector employees the right to de novo consideration of
their Title VII claims." (emphasis added)); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 48-49 (Title VII's legislative
history manifests intent that the individual has the right to pursue claims under Title VII as
well as other applicable state and federal statutes). The Long courts were not necessarily
wrong, but they failed to recognize that a question existed. I think the question is far from
settled. If this protection against preclusion extended only to employees and not employers,
that would have additional important consequences for analysis of the Court's preclusion
doctrine. Such an inquiry, however, is beyond the scope of this endeavor.
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A.

Issue vs. Claim Preclusion

Do the same rules apply regardless of whether a party is relying on issue
preclusion or claim preclusion? That is, if a federal court is bound to apply
the state's rules of preclusion as to an agency's determination of an issue
of fact, must the federal court also apply the state's rules regarding whether
an agency adjudication will bar subsequent claims?
Administrative issue preclusion alone will generally frustrate an attempt
by a plaintiff who was unsuccessful before the agency from bringing a
subsequent action in federal court. In fact, administrative claim preclusion
will arise only when the plaintiff either lost before the agency and now
wants to raise a related claim or theory of the case in federal court,178 or
prevailed below and now seeks additional remedies in federal court. In the
former case, claim preclusion might bar the plaintiff from pursuing a claim
based on the same transaction under a different statutory right in federal
court even if issue preclusion would not foreclose the claim. For example,
if at his disciplinary hearing, Elliott had contested unsuccessfully the charge
that his work performance was inadequate, or that he had engaged in
misconduct, without raising the issue of racial discrimination, administrative
claim preclusion nonetheless might operate to bar him from subsequently
79
bringing a federal civil rights action.
Furthermore, for plaintiffs who have prevailed before an agency, claim
preclusion may jeopardize otherwise legitimate federal statutory claims for
attorneys' fees. Title VII, for example, empowers the court to award
attorneys' fees to a plaintiff who prevails on an employment discrimination
claim through state administrative or judicial proceedings. 80 But in state
courts and agencies that have no authority to award fees, a prevailing
party's right to recover fees will only be cognizable in federal court.' If

178. Under the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, claim preclusion
bars not only claims that were raised below, but also those that could have been, but were
not, raised below. See Shreve, supra note 28, at 1212.
A new claim is precluded when it is so closely related to a previously raised
claim that together they constitute a "claim" in a larger sense. This expanded
concept of a claim is intended to signify all of the alternative legal theories and
the full scope of remedies generated by the facts of the original controversy.
Id.
179. In other words, even were it true that his work performance was inadequate and that
he engaged in misconduct, but for preclusion, Elliott would prevail on his civil rights claim if
he could establish that similarly situated white employees were not discharged. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (black employee allegedly fired for illegal
activity must be given opportunity to show that white employees who engaged in similar
activity were retained or rehired).
180. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
181. The Supreme Court has never ruled on the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction over Title
VII. The majority rule is that state courts lack concurrent jurisdiction that would empower
them to award fees. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. General Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 110, 112 (3d Cir.
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fees are deemed an additional remedy, then8 claim
preclusion arguably may
2
operate to vitiate the right to recover them.

The fate of plaintiffs who lose before an administrative agency is similarly
in doubt. The Court in Allen held that section 1738 barred relitigation in

a section 1983 action of the issue of the legality of a search first determined
in a criminal prosecution suppression hearing. Despite arguments that the
holding should not be extended to bar the assertion of a federal claim
which had never been litigated in a related state proceeding," s3 the entire
Migra Court found the Allen reasoning controlling, and held a plaintiff
who had been successful in her state court action to be bound by the
preclusion laws of that state under section 1738 on a subsequent section

1983 claim in federal court. But that result hinged in large measure on the
Court's construction of section 1738, and its finding that section 1983 did

not create an exception.

84

Yet administrative preclusion doctrine need not

necessarily produce the same result given the Court's holding that section
1738 does not apply to the unreviewed determinations of state agencies.
The Court's decision in Elliott, the linchpin of which was the Utah

Construction dicta, was limited to issue preclusion:
[W]e hold that when a state agency "acting in a judicial capacity ...
resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have
had an adequate opportunity to litigate" federal courts must give the

1986) (federal jurisdiction over Title VII claims is exclusive). But see Lindas v. Cady, 150
Wis. 2d 421, 441 N.W.2d 705 (1989) (state court has concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII
claims).
In New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 61-63 (1980), the Court held that
a federal court was empowered to award fees under Title VII to a party who prevailed on his
claim before state administrative and judicial tribunals, when such tribunals lacked power to
award such fees. The Supreme Court held subsequently in North Carolina Dep't of Transp.
v. Crest, 479 U.S. 6, 15 (1986), that § 1988 provides no right to one who had prevailed on
an administrative Title VI claim to bring suit in federal court solely to recover attorneys' fees.
However, even if Crest applies to Title VII, see Attorneys' Fees, supra note 42, at 393-94,
406 & n.184, it still would not resolve the preclusion issue when the plaintiff previously filed
a protective federal lawsuit, yet the case is resolved thereafter by state tribunals. Neither Carey
nor Crest raised any preclusion question.
182. This might occur if the claim preclusion rules of the state would bar the suit for
additional remedies. See, e.g., McNasby v. Crown Cork & Seal, Inc., 888 F.2d 270 (3d Cir.
1989) (reversing district court's dismissal of federal claim for additional remedies because
Pennsylvania law would not bar the claim).
183. These arguments relied in part on cases such as Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.,
448 U.S. 261, 280-83 (1980), which suggested that the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution might require application of the original state's issue preclusion, but not claim
preclusion, rules. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I; see Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, 829 F.2d
1056, 1068 (1 lth Cir. 1987); Atwood, supra note 12, at 75-76.
184. Amici in Migra had urged that it was inconsistent with congressional purpose to apply
claim preclusion to a § 1983 action involving matters not actually litigated in the prior action.
See Smith, supra note 28, at 78.
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agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be
entitled in the State's courts.l1s

The states that participated as amici in Elliott in support of applying

preclusion never urged that the holding be broadened to encompass claim
preclusion as well, 8 ' and circuit courts subsequently have refused to so

extend the Elliott doctrine.
mingham,

s

87

For example, in Gjellum v. City of Bir-

the Eleventh Circuit refused to apply claim preclusion to bar

a police officer who had successfully challenged his suspension before the
county personnel board from subsequently suing for damages under section
1983.189 The court held that nothing in Elliott, nor any "federal commonlaw of preciusion"

compelled it to apply state claim preclusion rules

regarding unreviewed state agency determinations to claims under section
1983, and that to fashion any such rule would frustrate the purposes behind

the civil rights laws.' 90 The court found the distinctions between issue
preclusion and claim preclusion sufficiently compelling to adhere to full

185. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986) (citation omitted) (quoting
United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)) (emphasis added).
But see Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820, 828 (5th Cir. 1989) (Jones, J., dissenting) (Utah
Construction "referred generally to principles of res judicata and did not distinguish between
issue and claim preclusion.").
186. See Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of Kansas and Other Joining States at 15,
Elliott, 478 U.S. at 788 (No. 85-588) [hereinafter "States' Amicus Brief"] ("The granting of
issue preclusion to such agency decisions will resolve the dilemma and continue to leave the
federal district courts as final enforcers of civil rights claims.").
187. See Ojellum, 829 F.2d at 1064-65; see also Frazier, 873 F.2d at 824 (holding administrative proceeding afforded no claim preclusion in § 1983 action under either federal or
Louisiana law).
188. 829 F.2d at 1056.
189. John Gjellum, a Birmingham, Alabama police officer, was suspended from his job for
tape recording his conversations with other police officers. Gjellum appealed to the Jefferson
County Personnel Board which reversed the suspension, based on the lack of any police
department policy forbidding such tape recording. The City sought review by the Circuit Court
of Jefferson County and, although Gjellum was not allowed to intervene in those proceedings,
the court affirmed the Board's decision.
Gjellum then filed a § 1983 claim in federal district court. The court granted summary
judgment for the defendants, holding that after Elliott, Gjellum was barred by claim and issue
preclusion from relitigating matters decided by the Board. Alternatively, the court found that
Gjellum was not entitled to relief on the merits. On review, because Gjelium had prevailed
before the Board, the appellate court deemed issue preclusion irrelevant, as it "would at most
limit [defendants'] ability to relitigate issues decided adversely to them in the prior proceedings."
Id. at 1060. Thus the court of appeals focused on the claim preclusive aspect of the district
court's holding.
First the court of appeals analyzed whether Alabama would give claim preclusive effect to
the judgment of the state court. Because Gjellum was not a party to the state court proceedings,
the court of appeals concluded that the Alabama courts, which require, inter alia, that "the
parties to both suits are substantially identical," would not afford claim preclusive effect to
the state court's judgment. Id. at 1060. The court then analyzed whether Elliott required the
federal court to apply the state's claim preclusion rules to the Board's determination. Id. at
1058-65.
190. Id. at 1065-67.
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faith and credit policies in the context of the former, but not the latter.' 9'
As the court recognized in Gjellum, the refusal to apply claim preclusion,
as opposed to issue preclusion, creates no risk that the court's determination
will be inconsistent with the agency determination, so that concerns regarding
comity and federalism are not compelling. 92 Generally, the state agency will
lack jurisdiction or authority to entertain the federal claim, and may be
incapable of awarding remedies available in federal court. 93
Arguably, strict application of claim preclusion might bar the subsequent

action nonetheless if plaintiff voluntarily chose to bring his action in a state
administrative forum of limited jurisdiction, and could have joined all his
claims-federal and state, under pendent jurisdiction-in a federal action.'9
While preclusion in such a case is generally troubling, 95 it would be especially

191. Id. at 1069.
192. Id. at 1064, 1065 n.21.
With respect to the claim preclusive effect of unreviewed state agency rulings,
we conclude that the importance of the federal rights at issue, the desirability of
avoiding the forcing of litigants to file suit initially in federal court rather than
seek relief in an unreviewed administrative proceeding, and the limitations of
state agencies as adjudicators of federal rights override the lessened federalism
concerns implicated outside the contours of the full faith and credit statute. In
addition, claim preclusion, unlike issue preclusion, does not create a risk of
inconsistent results ....
Id. at 1064; see also Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 189 (3d Cir. 1982)
(en banc) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) ("An interpretation of Title VII and section 1738 which
recognizes issue preclusion in those instances in which a claimant resorts to state court judicial
review is a reasonable accommodation between conflicting federal policies favoring vindication
of civil rights and state policies favoring finality of judicial determinations."). But see
Perschbacher, supra note 13, at 446-47 (finality of judgments more important than inconsistent
resolution of factual issues); Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the
Doctrine of Issue Preclusion Make an Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a
Court of Law?, 55 FoRmam L. Rav. 63 (1986) (issue preclusion serves less important finality
interests than claim preclusion).
See infra notes 323-31 and accompanying text for discussion of federal and state interests
in preclusion.
193. See, e.g., Boykins v. Ambridge Area School Dist., 621 F.2d 75, 79 (3d Cir. 1980) (no
res judicata accorded determination of Human Relations Commission in subsequent § 1983
suit because Commission lacked authority to award damages).
194. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 404 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (plaintiff who failed to allege state claims in federal suit should be barred from
subsequently asserting them in state suit); see also Shreve, supra note 28, at 1261-62 (suggesting
that federal claim preclusion rules might require parties with claims under federal statutes that
provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction to append state claims or risk forfeiting opportunity
to bring second action). But see REsTATEimNT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTs § 26(l)(c) (1980),
stating that there is no preclusion where:
plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain
remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on the
subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or restrictions on their authority . . .
and the plaintiff desires in the second action to rely on that theory or to seek
that remedy or form of relief ....
Id.
195. See Shreve, supra note 28, at 1261-63 (such claim preclusion rules may interfere with
state courts' ability to develop their own substantive law).
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problematic when applied to unreviewed state agency determinations and
would undercut the reasons for having less formal, more expeditious agency
96
resolution of various disputes.
In fact, some lower courts have understandably shown reluctance to so

extend preclusion, even when the administrative determination has been
reviewed by a state court. In Healy v. Town of Pembroke Park,197 the
Eleventh Circuit allowed four discharged police officers, who had successfully attacked their dismissal before the Florida Public Employees Relations

Commission, to bring a section 1983 action for supplemental relief despite
a state court affirmance of the Commission's order on review sought by
the town. 98 The court noted that the Commission lacked the power to

award either compensatory damages for mental anguish, or punitive damages,' 99 and rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs could have

joined their section 1983 claim with their state court action to enforce the
Commission's order. 200 Section 1983's intent was to supplement, not supplant, state remedies; thus, said the court, it would be inconsistent with the
intent of section 1983 to apply preclusion. 20' Similarly, in Reynolds v. New
York State Department of CorrectionalServices,20 2 a federal district court
in New York refused to apply Kremer to bar plaintiff's Title VII claim.

Although plaintiff had lost before the New York State Division of Human

196. See Frazier, 873 F.2d at 824.
This holding [that claim preclusion is inapplicable to agency determination in
subsequent § 1983 suit] permits plaintiffs to pursue administrative remedies
without jeopardizing their § 1983 claims ....
In addition, it has the practical
effect of encouraging plaintiffs to seek administrative remedies before turning to
the federal courts. A contrary result would encourage plaintiffs to bypass administrative proceedings in order to preserve their claims under § 1983.
Id.
197. 831 F.2d 989 (l1th Cir. 1987).
198. Id. at 990-91. The Commission had ordered the Town of Pembroke Park to reinstate
the four officers and pay them back wages. Plaintiffs subsequently sought supplemental relief
under § 1983 in federal district court for compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys'
fees. The district court had granted the town's motion to dismiss based on administrative res
judicata. Id.
199. Id. at 991-92 ("In the Eleventh Circuit it is well settled that res judicata will not
operate to bar matters which were not raised before an administrative agency and over which
it did not have jurisdiction.").
200. Id. at 992.
201. Id. at 992-93.
Congress realized in enacting § 1983 that it was altering the balance of judicial
power between the state and federal courts, and in doing so it was adding to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, not subtracting from that of the state courts.
[G]iven the intent of broad constructions and expansive use of § 1983 and its
attendant remedies, it must be concluded that the limited state administrative
remedies which were made available to the plaintiffs as a result of the unfair
labor practice charge filed by their union, does [sic] not restrict or preclude their
attempt to become whole by seeking additional damages in the federal forum.
Id. (citation omitted).
202. 568 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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Rights, and had unsuccessfully sought state court review, the court found
that the state determination was inconsistent with Title VII doctrine, since

New York law tolerated a broader BFOQ ("bona fide occupational qualification") exception to employment discrimination than did federal law
under Title VII.203
Notably, neither Reynolds nor Healy purports to analyze the preclusion

question in terms of section 1738; they return instead to the purpose behind
the federal civil rights laws, Title VII in the case of Reynolds, section 1983
in the case of Healy. Given the Court's interpretation of section 1738 in
Migra and Kremer,204 however, the question of whether claim preclusion
would operate in the case of reviewed state agency determinations is likely
to be a function of state, rather than federal, law. 205 As to unreviewed state

agency determinations, however, it is not at all clear what the Court will
do.

B. Adjudicatory vs. Investigatory Determinations
Agency adjudications range greatly in formality. 2°6 Unlike the "due process" hearings states hold before they take adverse action against state
employees 2 7-such as the hearing in Elliott-many agencies, both state and
203. Id. at 750-51.
204. There has been some controversy over whether Kremer was solely an issue preclusion
case, or encompassed claim preclusion as well. Since Kremer lost below, issue preclusion alone
was sufficient to bar his subsequent action, and it was unnecessary for the Court to reach the
question of claim preclusion. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82
n.22 (1982).
The lower courts did not discuss whether it is the doctrine of res judicata or
collateral estoppel that applies here ....
It may be that petitioner would be
precluded under res judicata from pursuing a Title VII claim. However that may
be, it is undebatable that petitioner is at least estopped from relitigating the issue
of employment discrimination arising from the same events.
Id. The Court's reasoning seems to suggest that claim preclusion would apply as well. See,
e.g., id. at 466-67:
There is no question that this judicial determination precludes Kremer from
bringing "any other action, civil or criminal, based upon the same grievance" in
the New York courts. By its terms, therefore, § 1738 would appear to preclude
Kremer from relitigating the same question in federal court.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
205. See McNasby v. Crown Cork & Seal, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 1264, 1271-72 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(based on interpretation of Pennsylvania law, plaintiff who prevailed before Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission but who obtained limited monetary relief was barred by § 1738
from seeking additional relief in federal court because of state court affirmance of agency
determination), rev'd, 888 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1989); cf. Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275,
276, 282 (2d Cir. 1986) (based on interpretation of New York law, prisoner's § 1983 action
not precluded by earlier, successful state court proceeding because that proceeding could not
provide all of the civil rights damages that federal action could). But see Jackson, Matheson
& Piskorski, supra note 32, at 1516 (preclusion should not apply when federal and state
remedial standards differ).
206. See infra notes 261-65 and accompanying text.
207. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972) (due process would require
prior hearing before termination of teacher with vested property right in employment).
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federal, charged with enforcing non-discrimination laws, make determinations based on investigations only. 23 Although all sides are accorded the
opportunity to provide the investigator with relevant information, they may
or may not be offered the opportunity to challenge the information provided
by their opponents. Nor is there any pretense of a classic "hearing" at
which an impartial decisiomnaker presides over the offering and contesting

of evidence and argument.20 The Supreme Court's opinions in Kremer and
Elliott suggest that whether such an investigatory determination will be

accorded preclusive effect in a subsequent civil rights action will depend on
whether there was any state court review. In Kremer, the New York State
Division of Human Rights (NYHRD) determined there was no probable
cause to believe Mr. Kremer had been discriminated against solely on the
basis of such an investigatory hearing. The Court held that since that
decision was reviewed, albeit under the limited standard applicable to review
of agency determinations, section 1738 operated to bar the federal court
from relitigating the question of whether Chemical Construction Company
discriminated against Kremer on the basis of his ethnicity. The majority
rejected the argument that Kremer never had the hearing on his Title VII
claim that Congress intended him to have. 210 Rather, the majority found
that the administrative proceedings satisfied minimum due process standards
2
and deemed that sufficient to satisfy any rights Mr. Kremer had. "

208. See, e.g., Kremer, 456 U.S. at 483 (describing investigative procedures of NYS Division
of Human Rights). The EEOC is an example of a federal agency that has no adjudicatory
powers. See Informal Procedures, supra note 38, at 504-05.
209. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970) (due process hearing requires
impartial decisionmaker, right to retain counsel, opportunity to offer evidence and crossexamine witnesses and present argument). Although some agencies like the EEOC have neither
the administrative machinery, nor the authority to hold formal hearings, other agencies may
hold such a hearing at some stage. For example, OCR, if it determines after investigation that
there has been a violation of one of the statutes it enforces and it is unable to obtain
compliance through voluntary means, has the option either to hold a formal administrative
hearing, or refer the case to the Department of Justice for court litigation. See 34 C.F.R. §§

100.8, 100.9 (1988).

210. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 492-93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Thus, although it claims to grant a state court decision preclusive effect, in fact
the Court bars petitioner's suit based on the state agency's decision of no probable
cause. The Court thereby disregards the express provisions of Title VII, for, as
the Court acknowledges, Congress has decided that an adverse state agency
decision will not prevent a complainant's subsequent Title VII suit.
Id.
211. The majority's opinion reflects a remarkable lack of sensitivity to the limited nature
of the administrative proceedings and subsequent state court review. See Mann, supra note
46, at 439 (unacceptable risk of error in Kremer inasmuch as finding was made by an
investigator rather than impartial fact-finder and there was no opportunity to augment agency
record in proceedings before reviewing state court); Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra
note 32, at 1518-19 (§ 1738 should not apply when court decision was merely limited review
of agency investigatory determination).
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If Kremer never sought state court review, it is relatively certain that at
least two bases would have barred a federal court from affording preclusive

effect to the NYHRD's no probable cause determination. The first is
subsequently made explicit in Elliott: Congress never intended a Title VII
claimant to be precluded in federal court by an unreviewed state agency
determination. The second is implicit in Elliott: because section 1738 is

inapplicable to unreviewed state agency determinations, administrative preclusion must be based on federal common law. This common law, which
springs from the Utah Construction dicta, applies only to determinations
made by administrative agencies acting in a judicial capacity. Because an

agency like the NYHRD does not act in a judicial capacity, its determination
will not bar the reconsideration of the same issue or issues in a subsequent
federal civil rights action. 212 Thus, even for claims brought under section
1983, if the state agency has not held a trial-like hearing in making its
determination-and that determination has not been reviewed by any state
court-nothing the Supreme Court has said to date would suggest that any
federal court should-or could213-apply preclusive effect to the determi-

nation of that agency. And this must be true whether or not the courts of
the state in question would apply preclusive effect to the unreviewed state
21 4
agency determination.

C. Mandatory vs. Optional Use of Agency Processes
Another factor to consider in the preclusion analysis is whether the

plaintiff must pursue administrative remedies prior to filing a federal lawsuit.
Before an aggrieved employee can sue in federal court, she must first submit
her claim to the EEOC, or, in the case of a state or locality having
21
comparable nondiscrimination laws, to the relevant state or local agency. 1

212. Cf. Doe v. New York Univ., 511 F. Supp. 606, 608-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that OCR findings of discrimination should shift burden of proof to
defendant to prove no discrimination, because OCR determination was based on investigatory,
not adjudicatory procedures).
213. While Kremer suggested that minimum due process for purposes of § 1738 was satisfied
by the investigatory determination of the NYHRD, and the state court review to insure the
determination comported with applicable law, I believe it would be inconsistent with due
process for a federal court to afford preclusive effect to a purely investigative determination
that was never reviewed by any court. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 482-83 (if initial "judgment"
fails to comport with due process, then "there could be no constitutionally recognizable
preclusion at all").
214. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(9) (McKinney 1982) (party who filed with NYHRD precluded
from bringing any other action based on same grievance); Scott v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., No.
36312 (N.Y. App. May 23, 1989) (LEXIS, States Library, NY file) ("[O]nce a grievance is
taken to the State Division, the election to do so cannot be undone through the simple
expedient of dropping the proceedings before that agency and commencing an action in
court."); see also id. (charge filed with EEOC constitutes election of remedies under Exec.
Law § 297(9) thus precluding state court suit under Human Rights Law).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (c), (f) (1982).
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Thus the agency has the first crack at resolving the Title VII dispute. Only
if the agency fails to resolve the dispute within the statutory time period
(180 days, in the case of the EEOC, or 240 days, in the case of the state
or local agency), will the EEOC issue the putative plaintiff a right-to-sue

notice, her ticket into federal court under Title VII.216 It would not be just
to apply preclusion to an agency determination that the parties were forced

to tolerate, even if the agency determination was made in a court-like
proceeding. The Court has recognized as much in interpreting Title VII to
217
guarantee a right to trial de novo.

Unlike Title VII, section 1983 has no exhaustion requirement of any

kind. 21s Thus one can proceed directly to federal court on a section 1983

claim, bypassing any relevant local, state or federal administrative avenues

for resolving the underlying dispute. Does the existence of this option
suggest that the application of preclusion to the determination made by an

agency to which the individual voluntarily submits his claim should be of
less concern? 2 9 Interestingly, some of those who argued in the past in favor

of an administrative exhaustion requirement for section 1983 bolstered their
argument with reassurance to critics that res judicata and collateral estoppel
would be inapplicable to the determinations made by such agencies. 220
The absence of an administrative filing requirement does not mean that

prior resort to administrative remedies is undesirable. Congress has established and encouraged the utilization of non-mandatory federal ad-

216. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28.
217. See Elliott, 478 U.S. at 795-96 (to give preclusive effect to unreviewed state agency
determination on employment discrimination claim in Title VII action would be inconsistent
with § 2000e-5(b) and Court's prior holding in Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976)).
Preclusion is inapplicable under Title VII even if the party voluntarily submitted her claim to
an administrative hearing. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 796 n.5.
218. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (application of Wisconsin's notice of claim
requirement to § 1983 action filed in state court inconsistent with no exhaustion requirement);
Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502, 516 (1982) (Congress never intended and Court
declines to fashion exhaustion requirement for § 1983 actions brought in federal court).
219. Compare Davis, 688 F.2d at 178 (Garth, J., concurring) (preclusion afforded this
reviewed state agency determination even less troubling than in Kremer because "Ms. Davis
was not obliged as was Kremer, to defer to a local administrative agency in the first instance")
and Carpenter v. Reed ex rel. Department of Pub. Safety, 757 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1985) (if
plaintiff was required to first submit dispute to Personnel Board, then Board's determination
would preclude subsequent discrimination complaint) with Daniels v. Barry, 659 F. Supp. 999,
1001 (D.D.C. 1987) (absence of an exhaustion requirement in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
is evidence that D.C. Office of Human Rights determination does not preclude federal claim
brought under § 504).
220. See Patsy, 457 U.S. at 532 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[Exhaustion of state remedies]
does not defeat federal-court jurisdiction, it merely defers it."); Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ.,
634 F.2d 900, 910 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Unlike judicial actions, state administrative proceedings
carry no resjudicata or collateral estoppel baggage into federal court.") rev'd, 457 U.S. 496
(1982); Bacharach, Section 1983 and An Administrative Exhaustion Requirement, 40 OKLA.
L. REv. 407, 411 (1987) (exhaustion requirement would only postpone exercise of federal
jurisdiction).
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ministrative procedures for enforcement of claims arising under Title VI
and similar nondiscrimination statutes .221 Encouraging the utilization of state
agency procedures is also sound policy: Disputes resolved through such
processes will help alleviate the burden on the federal courts, and allow
state tribunals to further their own state interests. 2 2 Distinguishing between
mandatory and voluntary utilization of agency procedures would be counterproductive to such policy. If litigants bypass administrative remedies
merely to preserve their federal civil rights claims, the number of cases on
the federal docket will increase. The docket would be cluttered not only
with claims brought by Title VII litigants unable to resolve their disputes
at the administrative level, but also by litigants with other civil rights claims
who might have satisfactorily resolved their disputes through informal
223
agency processes.
Applying preclusion to determinations made by optional administrative
processes has other serious consequences. It detrimentally restricts the choices
available to parties deciding whether to attempt resolution of a potential
dispute informally through agency proceedings. The considerations may be
different when one is choosing between filing a discrimination complaint
with a government funding agency or filing a lawsuit on the same claim,
than when one is deciding whether to apply for unemployment compensation
benefits upon termination of employment. 224 In either case, however, concerns about the preclusive effects of the agency determinations will burden
the choice of whether to initially attempt agency processes.2 5 Those aware
of the possible consequences of their choice may choose to forego the
administrative process in order to preserve the right to a judicial determination, thus frustrating a primary purpose in creating administrative

221. I have argued elsewhere that it makes no sense to distinguish between Title VI and
Title VII proceedings for purposes of awarding attorneys' fees for civil rights cases resolved
administratively. See Attorneys' Fees, supra note 42, at 416-20. Given Congress' desire for
consistency among the civil rights laws, see supra note 157, I am unpersuaded by the Court's
conclusion in Elliott, based on specific language in Title VII, that Congress intended a different
preclusion result under that law than under the other civil rights/antidiscrimination schemes.
222. See discussion infra notes 323-31 and accompanying text.
223. Davis, 688 F.2d at 193 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
The advantages of resorting in the first instance to a procedure whereby disputes
may be resolved by conference, conciliation and persuasion are evident: an
unrepresented claimant may seek and sometimes be awarded relief; the parties
may informally resolve their differences without the bitterness engendered by
litigation; and the courts are spared the additional burdens of yet more lawsuits.
Id.
224. See infra notes 250-56 (discussing relevance in preclusion analysis of whether claim
adjudicated by agency is related to subsequent federal civil rights claim).
225. See Delgado v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 815 F.2d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 1987) ("Granting
deference to unreviewed decisions of this agency in subsequent ADEA lawsuits could cause
potential plaintiffs to forego their chance at unemployment compensation for fear of jeopardizing their ADEA claims or else force employees and employers to litigate unemployment
compensation claims as discrimination suits.").
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forums for dispute resolution.226 Furthermore, those who lack the benefit

of counsel (or have unsophisticated counsel), may not be aware that the
choice is burdened. "' 7 In formulating rules of preclusion for administrative
determinations, judges must be cognizant that agencies exist, in part, so
that those unsophisticated in the law may have the opportunity for fair

redress of grievances, without counsel and without the onerous costs of
judicial litigation. When possible, promulgators of rules should avoid creating rules that allow individuals to forfeit unwittingly their rights to judicial
remedies.
D.

Voluntary vs. Involuntary Litigants

Should it make a difference whether the party seeking relief in federal
court voluntarily submitted to the prior proceeding? If a plaintiff in the
federal action prevailed before the agency in the first action, but that
determination was overturned by a state court on review sought by the
losing defendant, should that matter in the court's analysis of whether or
not to preclude the federal claim?
In McCurry v. Allenn s the nature of the first proceeding, a suppression

of evidence hearing, persuaded the court of appeals that the application of
preclusion to bar McCurry's section 1983 claim would compromise his rights
to have a federal court determine his federal claim.229 The Supreme Court
226. See Davis, 688 F.2d at 193-94 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
This leads to the patently unsatisfactory conclusion that complainants will be
well-advised to bypass the state administrative machinery.... The courts and
judges of this country, from the Chief Justice of the United States down, have
repeatedly spoken of the need to seek dispute resolution mechanisms outside of
litigation. There is also a public policy, reflected in various statutes requiring
initial resort to state administrative procedures, to use that procedure whenever
possible.... I dissent from this example of what one of our colleagues frequently
refers to as "mechanical jurisprudence."
Id.; accord id. at 189 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (majority position applying preclusion will
result in bypassing state conciliation efforts); see also McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466
U.S. 284, 292 n.ll (1984) (holding no preclusion in § 1983 claim based on prior arbitration
finding because, inter alia, contrary rule might cause employees to bypass arbitration); cf.
Attorneys' Fees, supra note 42, at 419 (describing similar consequences if attorneys' fees are
not available for successful administrative resolution of dispute).
227. See Davis, 688 F.2d at 193 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
[Blecause she sought to utilize the informal procedure which the State of Pennsylvania provides for persons who believe themselves to be victims of racial
discrimination, because she chose to conciliate rather than litigate in the first
instance, and because she was successful in that effort, thereby giving U.S. Steel
the opportunity to invoke the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts, Ms. Davis
will lose the $50,736.11 judgment awarded to her by the district court.
Id.
228. 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
229. Id. at 798-99; see Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. Rav. 837, 970 (1984) (noting that
McCurry had no opportunity to cross-claim for damages in suppression hearing, and limited
opportunity for discovery).
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disagreed, finding section 1738 required application of state preclusion law
that would bar relitigation of the factual determination made in the earlier
proceeding. 2 0 The dissent would have created an exception in the case of
an involuntary criminal defendant.2'
Yet Allen involved no administrative determination; the issue arose in the
context of state court/federal court preclusion. And in Kremer,23 which did
involve a prior administrative decision, the question of involuntariness did
not arise. Mr. Kremer lost all of his state administrative and state court
review proceedings; thus when he presented his Title VII claim to the federal
courts, he had never been an involuntary litigant. The Court emphasized
the fact that Mr. Kremer was not requiredto seek state court review of the
adverse state agency determination, and that once he had made that election,
he could not be heard to complain that he was entitled to a federal forum
233
as well.
But what if Mr. Kremer had won before the New York State Division
of Human Rights, and Chemical Construction Corp. had successfully appealed that determination to state court? Would Mr. Kremer still be denied
his federal forum for adjudication of his federal Title VII claim? Under
the Court's reasoning that section 1738 is controlling, it appears that the
voluntary or involuntary status of the litigant in a reviewed state agency
2 4
proceeding makes no difference.
This situation faced the Third Circuit in Davis v. United States Steel
Supply,2 35 a case it decided shortly after the Court handed down Kremer.
Davis prevailed on his racial intolerance complaint before the Pittsburgh
Commission of Human Relations after a full adversarial hearing.236 U.S.
Steel then appealed to the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas,
which affirmed. 237 U.S. Steel appealed again to the Commonwealth Court,
which unanimously reversed the Court of Common Pleas and held that the
administrative record contained inadequate support for the conclusion that
U.S. Steel had violated the applicable Pittsburgh ordinance. Davis chose
not to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and instead filed a section

230. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).
231. Id. at 113-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Atwood, supra note 12, at 97-98 & nn.18990 (noting that some lower court cases had drawn distinctions for § 1983 claim preclusion
purposes as to whether a litigant was voluntarily or involuntarily before the state court, but
that the rationale of such cases would not survive the Court's reasoning in Allen).
232. 456 U.S. at 461.
233. Id. at 469-70.
234. See id. at 504-05 n.18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In some future case, the Court
may find such a result inimical to Title VII but, given today's decision, no complainant could
safely predict that the Court would not apply § 1738.").
235. 688 F.2d at 166.
236. Id. at 168.
237. Id. at 168-69.

1990]

CIVIL RIGHTS

1981 action in federal district court.2 s The district court denied U.S. Steel's

res judicata motion, and, based principally on the Pittsburgh agency's
administrative record,2 9 decided U.S. Steel had violated section 1981 by

discriminatorily discharging plaintiff. Upon affirmance of that decision by
a panel, the Third Circuit granted en banc review.

Thus in at least five hearings relating to the merits of her complaint,
only one tribunal rejected Ms. Davis' proof that U.S. Steel had discriminated
against her on the basis of her race. Nor did that court decide that U.S.

Steel had not discriminated against Ms. Davis; merely, that the administrative record failed to demonstrate that it had. 24 1 Nonetheless, the full panel
242
of the court of appeals held Ms. Davis' section 1981 claim to be barred.
The court found Kremer controlling, and was unimpressed by the relevance

of Ms. Davis' involuntary status before the one proceeding that rejected
her proof.243

The Court's approach to administrative preclusion in federal civil rights
litigation, even concerning voluntary litigants, disserves Congress' intent

238. Id. at 169.
239. The parties stipulated to a decision based on the record, with some supplementation.
Id. at 170.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 185 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
242. The court found that Pennsylvania courts would preclude Ms. Davis' claim, and that
§ 1981 created no exception to § 1738. Id. at 170-77.
243. Id. at 177. Judge Garth contributed a reluctant concurrence, stating that he was forced
to agree that Kremer left the court with no alternative. Although he always believed that
Congress intended to provide victims of discrimination with a federal fact-finding forum,
Kremer had rejected that notion, id., and the Court had drawn no distinction between cases
in which the plaintiff was the one to take the case into the state courts, and cases in which a
losing defendant did so:
Justice White, writing for the Kremer Court. must have been aware of Justice
Blackmun's dissenting observation, the thrust of which was that res judicata
should not apply where the plaintiff had not sought judicial review of the
administrative action but had rather been forced into a state forum by the
defendant.... [Tihe Supreme Court has clearly indicated that no such distinction
can avoid the res judicata bar. Thus, at least to me, it is now evident that §
1738 bars a federal proceeding which seeks to litigate the same discriminatory
actions adjudicated in a prior state court proceeding, even though it was not the
plaintiff who chose the state court forum.
Id. at 178 (citations omitted); accord Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 727 F.2d 27, 29 (Ist
Cir. 1984) (Kremer rationale applies to state court reversal of administrative determination
favorable to plaintiff). But see Davis, 688 F.2d at 188-89 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (recognizing
issue preclusion when complainant chooses state court review, but not when it is sought by
respondent, is reasonable accommodation between need for finality and civil rights policies);
Smith, supra note 28, at 80-81:
Kremer's and Migra's description of section 1738 as a strict mandate to apply
the issuing state's law is contrary to a substantial body of precedent. Therefore,
the Court's opinion should not be interpreted as an implied rejection of similar
flexibility in the application of section 1738 to civil rights cases in which the
party precluded has not had a chance to exercise the choice of forum that sections
1983 and 1343 were intended to guarantee.
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that an aggrieved party have a federal forum for adjudicating a federal
claim. The Court's failure to distinguish between civil rights victims who
have voluntarily placed their case before a state court, such as Mr. Kremer,
and those who have not, such as Ms. Davis, further erodes Congress'
purpose in passing the civil rights laws.2 If every time a defendant who
lost before a state agency sought state court review, the only Title VII cases
originally adjudicated by a state agency that would end up in federal court
would be those in which the state agency entirely rejected the employment
discrimination claim.2 5 Admittedly, it would be a strained interpretation of
section 1738 which would allow one result in the case of the voluntary
litigant and another in the case of the involuntary litigant. 246 But this hardly
proves that the result in Davis was correct; rather it underscores the
deficiencies in the Court's application of section 1738 to limited state court
review of state agency determinations.
The preceding discussion has focused almost exclusively on state agency
proceedings in which losing defendants sought state court review, and thus
the Court's interpretation of section 1738 controlled. The situation will
likely arise in the future where the Court must consider the application of
its Elliott rule of common law preclusion to a plaintiff who was involuntarily
haled before an administrative agency. 247 The Court may respond no differently than it did in Elliott, by fashioning a rule which would incorporate
the Utah Construction dicta and the state's own rules of preclusion. 248 Yet
here, too, the application of preclusion to bar from federal court one who
voluntarily submits to an agency's processes is, along the continuum of
injustice, less extreme than the application of preclusion to bar one who

244. See Davis, 688 F.2d at 179 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) ("[A] review of the procedural
history of this unfortunate lawsuit will serve as a case study in the ability of determined
defendants to use the judicial process to delay and eventually deny accountability for discrimination.").
245. See id. at 189. This is assuming, of course, that state courts would afford preclusive
effect to the agency's decision. In order to avoid such consequences, the Title VII plaintiff
would have to insure that as soon as the statutory waiting period had run, see supra notes
215-27 and accompanying text, she would abandon the administrative proceedings and file her
claim in federal court.
246. Compare Mann, supra note 46, at 457 ("The rule articulated in Kremer also creates
the possibility that defendant, rather than plaintiff, can determine whether plaintiff will be
allowed a trial de novo in federal court.") with Catania, supra note 176, at 212, 264 (arguing
that Kremer would not be so bad as long as it is not extended to preclude complainants who
did not affirmatively seek state court redress, since Congress provided Title VII complainants
with a statutory right to a trial de novo of their Title VII claims).
247. See, e.g., Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir.
1985) (plaintiff's § 1983 claim for false arrest barred by probable cause determination in
administrative license revocation proceedings in which he was defendant).
248. In fact, Mr. Elliott's own situation was not far removed; he could have chosen to
leave quietly and not seek a hearing on his termination. Yet in a state disciplinary proceeding
an employee is much like an involuntary litigant, because not seeking agency review will result
in the loss of employment or other sanction.
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had no choice, and thus no opportunity for a "day in court" on his federal
claim. 9
E.

Related vs. UnrelatedAgency Proceedings

Some agency proceedings are part and parcel of the federal civil rights
enforcement scheme. Proceedings before the EEOC, or designated state and
local fair employment agencies, are part of the fabric of Title VII, part of
the congressional scheme. Proceedings before the Office for Civil Rights,
or before other civil rights enforcement arms of federal funding agencies
are components of Congress' overall purpose in enacting Titles VI, IX and
section 504. Should the determinations that these agencies make-all other
factors being equal-be accorded greater, lesser or the same preclusive effect
as determinations made by agencies unrelated to these enforcement schemes?
In Elliott, the factual determination at issue-whether Elliott was dismissed for reasons having to do with his race-was made in the context of
a state disciplinary proceeding. 0 In fact, the hearing examiner disavowed
any authority to adjudicate Elliott's federal civil rights claims but allowed
him to produce evidence of discrimination as an affirmative defense. 251 The
hearing examiner's findings included a determination that Elliott had failed
to prove that his firing was racially motivated.25 2 It was this factual determination that the Court said could not be accorded preclusive effect on a
Title VII claim, but could-perhaps must-on a section 1983 claim, if the
state's own courts would do so.
In Elliott, the Court did not discuss whether it mattered that the factual
determination was rendered in an administrative disciplinary proceeding,
rather than by a state fair employment agency. It is, I believe, a legitimate
inference that the Court believed any such distinction irrelevant. 2 53

249. The considerations here are similar to the unfairness that would result if one who was
required to exhaust administrative remedies were then deprived court review. See supra notes
215-27 and accompanying text.
250. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 790.
251. Id. at 791.
252. Id.
253. Some lower courts have afforded preclusion regardless of the lack of schematic
relationship between the agency determination and the federal claim. See, e.g., Zanghi, 752
F.2d at 46 (determination by license revocation board that defendant police department and
its agents had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for drunken driving precluded redetermination
of issue in § 1983 action for false arrest). Others have refused to apply administrative preclusion
in federal discrimination claims regardless of the relationship. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Department of the Army, 769 F.2d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Whether the prior administrative
findings be those of the Civil Service Commission, the EEOC, or any other federal agency is
immaterial.... Congress entrusted the ultimate resolution of discrimination to the federal
judiciary."). Interestingly, the states that filed an amicus brief in Elliott urged that the Court
afford preclusion to the factual findings of state agencies created to satisfy the dictates of the
federal due process clause, while seeming to concede that the same treatment would not be
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Arguably, however, courts should show a greater willingness to afford

preclusive effect to determinations made by agencies with some particular
civil rights expertise. If an agency regularly makes such determinations, then
its findings appropriately might carry more probative weight than similar
findings by agencies whose principle business lies elsewhere. Preclusion, and

deference generally, is less appropriate when the agency in question has no
254

particular expertise.

The Supreme Court has struggled to identify the kind of proof that will
support an inference of intentional racial discrimination.255 Lower federal
courts have struggled to follow its leadership. 256 How much weight, then,
should a court give a determination made by a state disciplinary board, or
unemployment compensation board, as to whether an elusive motivation
like racial animosity informed an employment decision? Understandably,
from time to time agencies must make such factual determinations for
purposes of the particular administrative schemes they enforce. But the
probative value of those determinations will vary greatly from one factual
scenario to another, from one bureaucratic decisionmaker to another. Prohibiting the reexamination of such a determination in a collateral action
filed to enforce federal nondiscrimination obligations, or remedy civil rights
violations, is far too extreme and costly an approach, even to protect

accorded factual determinations made by state fair employment agencies. See Elliott, States'
Amicus Brief, supra note 186, at 4. Their reasoning was that the Supreme Court should not
require such due process hearings on one hand, and on the other allow federal courts to upend
the decisions of such agencies by ignoring their determinations in collateral litigation. Id. at
11-12.
254. Some circuit courts have agreed. See, e.g., Delgado, 815 F.2d at 646 (Unreviewed
unemployment compensation proceeding's determination that plaintiff was discharged for
violating employer's policies did not preclude relitigation of age discrimination claim. "[W]e
find it unnecessary to determine whether the findings of a state administrative agency should
be denied preclusive effect in all cases because the findings at issue here are not the result of
proceedings before a state agency charged with the enforcement of state age discrimination
laws.") reh'g denied, 820 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1987); cf. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distribs.,
798 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1986) (inadequate opportunity to litigate age discrimination
claims before unemployment compensation board).
These agencies must make other factual determinations for which they arguably have the
requisite expertise, such as whether or not Elliott violated any school policies. These determinations may be worthy of greater deference in a collateral proceeding. See infra notes 34692 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (foreseeability
alone not sufficient to establish intentional discrimination; action must have been taken because
of, not in spite of, its consequences); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1977) (identifying factors such as historical context, sequence
of events and legislative or administrative history as relevant to finding of intentional discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (discriminatory impact relevant to,
but not conclusive of, determination of intentional discrimination).
256. See, e.g., U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1221-35 (2d Cir. 1987)
(affirming district court's evidentiary findings of segregative intent in city's housing and
schools), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
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legitimate state interests in preventing federal courts from ignoring the
determinations of state agencies.
F,

State vs. Federal Administrative Proceedings

One other variable warrants mention: the effect on administrative preclusion doctrine when the first determination is made by a federal rather than
state agency. None of the civil rights preclusion cases that have reached the
Supreme Court as yet have involved dispositions made by federal administrative agencies. 257 Elliott is limited to the preclusive effect of unreviewed
state agency determinations. At least two things are clear when the agency
is federal: Section 1738 is inapplicable, and concerns regarding federalism
and comity are irrelevant to consideration of the preclusion question. It is
also clear from the Court's decisions in Kremer and Elliott that a determination by the EEOC will have no preclusive effect on a subsequent Title
VII claim in federal court. But what about a determination by the Office
for Civil Rights, or the Civil Service Commission, on a subsequent section
1983 claim? Will the Court automatically fall back on its Utah Construction
dicta, or will it hold the line on the erosion of federal civil rights? The
Court has the opportunity to limit its application of preclusion to state
agency determinations and not expand it to those of federal agencies.
Although I believe the distinction would be artificial 2 s nonetheless it is
preferable to any further expansion of preclusion doctrine to the determinations of federal agencies. Liberated from section 1738 and concerns of
federalism and comity, the Court will, I hope, adopt a presumption against
preclusion.
IV.

A.

THE ELEMENTS OF PROPER PRECLUSION

Process, Counsel and Informed Choices

1. Preclusion, Process and the Restatement
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments adopts in large measure the Utah
Construction approach to administrative preclusion. 2 9 Even within the
257. I have discovered few lower court cases in which this issue arises. See Nasem v. Brown,
595 F.2d 801, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that pro-federal employee decision by Civil Service
Commission on retaliation charge not given preclusive effect in Title VII action because first
decision lacked procedural safeguards sufficient to satisfy Utah Construction criteria). But cf.
Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634, 638 (2d Cir. 1989) (concluding, with
little analysis, that Department of Labor ALJ's finding of no harassment or retaliation for
filing of whistleblower complaint with Nuclear Regulatory Commission to be resjudicatabased
on Utah Construction criteria).
258. See infra notes 323-31 (similarity of federal and state interests in preclusion).
259. REsTATEMENT (ScoND) OF JuoDimENs § 83 (1982): Adjudicative Determination by
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Restatement's own exceptions, however, one may discern reasoning for

eschewing the application of preclusion that would foreclose adjudication
of federal civil rights claims. The Restatement's invocation might be characterized as follows: If the agency's procedures and mission are substantially
equivalent to that of a court, then the agency's determinations should be

treated like a court's determinations for purposes of preclusion. 260 The
problem with this is that an agency's procedures and mission are too often
not the same as those of a court. While administrative proceedings run the
gamut from the least to the most formal, they are seldom the equivalent
of judicial proceedings. The administrative proceeding which formed the
basis for preclusion in Kremer, for example, was only an investigation to
determine whether probable cause to go forward existed.26 Mr. Kremer
never received a hearing on his claim. In Elliott, the hearing, while extensive
262
and adversarial, was held before an employee of one of the defendants,

hardly an impartial factfinder. Even as to formal hearings under the

Administrative Tribunal
(1) Except as stated in Subsections (2), (3), and (4), a valid and final adjudicative
determination by an administrative tribunal has the same effects under the rules
of res judicata, subject to the same exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment
of a court.
(2) An adjudicative determination by an administrative tribunal is conclusive
under the rules of res judicata only insofar as the proceeding resulting in the
determination entailed the essential elements of adjudication, including:
(a) Adequate notice to persons who are to be bound by the adjudication...
(b) The right on behalf of a party to present evidence and legal argument in
support of the party's contentions and fair opportunity to rebut evidence and
argument by opposing parties;
(e) Such other procedural elements as may be necessary to constitute the
proceeding a sufficient means of conclusively determining the matter in question,
having regard for the magnitude and complexity of the matter in question, the
urgency with which the matter must be resolved, and the opportunity of the
parties to obtain evidence and formulate legal contentions ....
Id.

260. See

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 83 comment b:

Where an administrative agency is engaged in deciding specific legal claims or
issues through a procedure substantiallysimilar to those employed by courts, the
agency is in substance engaged in adjudication. Decisional processes using procedures whose formality approximates those of courts may properly be accorded
the conclusiveness that attaches to judicial judgments.
Id. (emphasis added). The comments cite the Administrative Procedure Act and Model State
Administrative Procedure Act provisions as examples of procedures adequate to afford preclusive effect. Id. at comment c. But see 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATrvE LAW TREATISE § 21.9 at
78 (2d ed. 1983). Professor Davis embraces the "rhyme, reason and rhythm" of resjudicata
and concludes that it should apply to administrative adjudications just as it does to judicial
ones, regardless of whether a litigant has had an opportunity to rebut evidence and argument
by opposing parties. He thus goes further than the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, and
fails to discuss any countervailing considerations in distinctions between administrative and
judicial processes, or the relevance of a particular statutory scheme to such an analysis.
261. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 464 (1982).
262. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 791 (1986).
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Administrative Procedure Act 263 or the Model State Administrative Procedure Act, hearsay is freely admissible, little if any pre-hearing discovery is

264
available to the parties, and there may be no compulsory subpoena power.

And while many state procedures may look relatively good in print, the

reality of what transpires at such hearings makes application of preclusion
principles to their determinations inappropriate. 265 These and other differences between judicial and agency decisionmaking make the application of
judicial-type rules of preclusion to agency determinations exceedingly prob-

lematic, especially as they affect the rights of civil rights litigants.
Consequently, while Elliott and many lower court cases have embraced the

Utah Construction dicta, far fewer courts have actually scrutinized the
agencies' procedures and found the application of preclusion appropriate in
subsequent civil rights litigation. 26

263. U.S.C. §§ 551-599, 701-706 (1988).
264. See, e.g., Boykins v. Ambridge Area School Dist., 621 F.2d 75, 79 (3d Cir. 1980)
(noting that Pennsylvania had narrowly circumscribed discovery tools available in Human
Relations Commission proceedings); Perschbacher, supranote 13, at 452-53 (agency procedures,
including those of the APA, not equivalent of judicial procedures); The Committee on Labor
and Employment Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Unemployment
InsuranceDecisions and the Doctrine of CollateralEstoppel, 40 Tm REcoRD 738, 742 (1985)
(hereinafter N. Y. Bar Committee Report) (New York State's Unemployment Compensation
hearings lack "opportunity for parties to seek information, prepare witnesses or gather other
evidence for presentation ....
[T]here is no provision for pre-hearing access to information
from one's adversary or a third party .... Nor, as a practical matter, can parties effectively
subpoena information ....

).

265. See N.Y. Bar Committee Report, supra note 264, at 740-41 ("Given the large number
of cases in the system and the relatively small number of [ALJ's] available to try these
contested matters, the regulatory demand for prompt determinations has resulted in hearings
that are brief, if not perfunctory."). In 1984, 52,000 cases were heard and decided by about
40 AL's, meaning each ALJ was responsible for 1300 cases.
The average hearing lasts from twenty to forty minutes. Significantly, the judges
not only try but render decisions in each of these half-dozen cases per day. In
practice, a judge has less than one hour to acquaint him or herself with the file,
take all testimony, hear argument, research any cases cited by the parties and
write the decision.
Id.; Resnik, supra note 12, at 620 ("Investigations of agencies, such as the New York Human
Rights Division and the Social Security Administration, reveal inadequate processes, erratic
decisionmaking, lack of resources, and administrative malfunctioning.").
266. See, e.g., Mack v. South Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board decision not entitled to preclusive effect in age
discrimination suit because parties lacked adequate opportunity to litigate factual issues relevant
to latter claim); Gargiul v. Tompkins, 704 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1983), vacated, 465 U.S. 1016
(1984), rev'd on other grounds, 739 F.2d 34 (1984) (no preclusion in § 1983 action because
hearing before Commissioner of Education was not adversarial); Anderson v. Babb, 632 F.2d
300, 306 n.3 (4th Cir. 1980) (no preclusion in litigation challenging election procedures where
state agency factfinder was not neutral); Nasem v. Brown, 595 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(inadequate procedural safeguards, particularly absence of live witness testimony); Donovan v.
Diplomat Envelope Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1417, 1422-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (employer not bound
by factual findings made in unemployment compensation hearing because of certain procedural
irregularities in those proceedings); Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 512 F.
Supp. 1266, 1269 (D. Mass. 1981) (limited ability to discover and present evidence; interested
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Preclusion, Process and Sophistication

Litigants who appear before agencies that regulate the economy, or
adjudicate commercial disputes, like the Bituminous Coal Commission in
1940,267 or the Federal Board of Contract Appeals in 1966,2 or the
Commodities Exchange Commission today,2 9 generally have the resources
and sophistication to insure that they protect their interests. Applying

preclusion to the determinations of such agencies under Restatement-like
criteria is therefore far less unsettling than when courts apply preclusion to
determinations made by agencies adjudicating disputes involving unsophisticated disputants like Rubin Kremer and Robert Elliott. 270 In fact, given
the tenor of the commentary to the Restatement, one might doubt whether
its drafters ever anticipated that the Supreme Court would apply administrative preclusion to the unreviewed determinations of agencies in subsequent
federal civil rights litigation. 271
tribunal); Perschbacher, supra note 13, at 458; Mann, supra note 46, at 441-45; cf. Friends
of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1985) (NYS Dept. of
Environmental Conservation's procedures deficient for purposes of Clean Water Act preclusion
of citizen suit); Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Fritzsche,
Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1138-39 (3d Cir. 1985) (EPA's informal enforcement
procedure lacking in procedural safeguards and right of intervention available in federal court
suit under Clean Water Act); Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., Inc., 592 F.2d 215, 217-19
(3d Cir. 1979) (Pennsylvania's Hearing Board procedures deficient; intervention as of right
not allowed citizens). But see, e.g., Nelson v. Jefferson County, Ky., 863 F.2d 18, 20 (6th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 76 (1989) (precluding § 1983 suit based on Police Merit
Board's upholding of plaintiff's discharge because Kentucky would apply preclusive effect to
the determination); Long v. Laramie County Community College Dist., 840 F.2d 743, 749,
751 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding Utah Construction criteria satisfied despite finding by district
court that agency's findings "were based on plaintiff's version of the facts, unsubstantiated
an[d] uncorroborated by any witnesses before the court."); Gear v. City of Des Moines, 514
F. Supp. 1218, 1224 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (applying issue preclusive effect to state unemployment
compensation hearing determination in subsequent §§ 1983 and 1985 claims, finding Utah
Construction criteria satisfied); cf. Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1321-22 (7th Cir.
1978) (Utah Construction dictates preclusion in Federal Tort Claim Act suit based on finding
of National Transportation Safety Board even though hearsay admissible and discovery
opportunities limited in administrative process where plaintiff unable to demonstrate actual
prejudice).
267. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (discussed supra
note 18 and accompanying text).
268. See United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966) (discussed supra
note 21 and accompanying text).
269. Cf. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1986)
(holding no article III violation when litigant knowingly chose more expeditious, less expensive
CFTC adjudication over litigation in article III court).
270. See Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1306 (8th Cir. 1988)
(distinguishing commercial from civil rights disputes in terms of mandatory arbitration and
preclusion); cf. Benjamin v. Traffic Executive Ass'n E. R.R., 869 F.2d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 1989)
(distinguishing application of issue preclusion to arbitrator's determination of whether railroad
employees were rate bureau employees for purposes of Staggers Act from arbitral preclusion
in federal civil rights claim).
271. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 comments a-i (1982). The comments
illustrate a variety of situations in which preclusion might be appropriate, and a variety in
which it would not. None of the former involved civil rights claims; several of the latter did.
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First, discrimination complainants are individuals, not corporations. Second, they tend to be individuals on the lower rungs of the social and
economic ladder. Third, they are generally not represented by counsel during
their administrative hearings. All of this means that they are in a weak
position to protect their long-term interests in the context of administrative
proceedings, and unlikely to know of their rights. 272 Explaining preclusion
doctrine to those versed in the law is a formidable challenge; how can we
expect unrepresented litigants to understand it and its consequences? When
Rubin Kremer sought state court review of the adverse agency determination,
he was simply doing what he thought he was supposed to do. 273 When the
Supreme Court subsequently informed Mr. Kremer that because he sought
state court review he could no longer bring his Title VII suit in federal
court, was he able to understand why? Although adequacy of process is
the point of departure, courts should be concerned as well with litigants'
274
If
ability to comprehend the preclusive consequences of their choices.
litigants have difficulty understanding why the law prevents them from
litigating their claims, their respect for the law and the courts in general
may diminish. 275

3.

Preclusion, Process and Bureaucracy

Regardless of whether litigants are aware of the potential preclusive
consequences of their choices, applying preclusion to agency determinations
272. See Mann, supra note 46, at 411 ("Congress conceived of Title VII as a tool to be
used by unschooled litigants, a right of action to ensure that complaints of invidious discrimination could be heard fairly and expeditiously."); id. at 451 (Kremer lacked incentive to
litigate fully at state level due to ignorance of possible subsequent preclusive effect of state
court determination); Braveman & Goldsmith, Rules of Preclusion and Challenges to Official
Action: An Essay on Finality, Fairness, and Federalism, All Gone Awry, 39 SYRAcUsE L.
REv. 599, 625 (1988) (noting that although litigants may be aware of their administrative
remedies, they are not aware of rules of preclusion, and may not consult attorney until
conclusion of administrative proceedings).
273. See Mann, supra note 46, at 452 (arguing that Kremer only appealed to state court
because his right to do so was set forth on notice attached to administrative decision).
274. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 506 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Court has ... constructed
a rule that will serve as a trap for the unwary pro se or poorly represented complainant.");
Evans v. Syracuse City School Dist., 704 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1983) (refusing to apply Kremer
holding to pro se plaintiff who was unaware of consequences of seeking state court review);
see also Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 317, 350 (1978)
(suggesting that claim preclusion should not apply to bar constitutional claim not raised in
prior state proceeding, especially when litigant lacked counsel); N. Y. Committee Bar Report,
supra note 264, at 743 (arguing against preclusive effect of unemployment compensation
hearings because, in part, applicants are unaware of possible preclusive effects of such
determinations on subsequent proceedings). But see Mann, supra note 46, at 461 n.315 and
accompanying text (citing cases in which courts held pro se litigants barred from subsequent
federal discrimination claim based on state court review of administrative determinations).
275. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Co., 477 F. Supp. 587, 593-94 ("Whatever increase
is attained in judicial efficiency through finalizing state court decisions is likely to be at the
expense of these [uninformed pro se] plaintiffs who will not know they should avoid our sister
courts."), aff'd, 623 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
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is troubling because of the institutional and political realities of administrative government. What agencies do when they adjudicate cannot be divorced
from what they do the rest of the time. Unlike courts, most agencies
combine a variety of quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative and executive functions. 276 Unlike courts, agencies use adjudications to further agency policy
and goals. 277 Thus their determinations may be shaped by the development
of overarching policy concerns at the expense of individual justice.
In addition, pragmatic concerns may interfere with the ability of administrative agencies to render decisions and make findings that merit preclusive
effect. Foremost among these is the need for an administrative adjudicator
to get through the day, the week, and the month. Given staggering caseloads
the quality of such adjudications, despite the best of intentions, must
inevitably suffer. Budgetary constraints may impair the ability of an agency
to deliver all the process that is due.2 78 It is highly problematic for a court
to afford preclusive effect, for example, to the determinations of an Unemployment Compensation Board hearing officer who has "less than one
hour to acquaint him or herself with the file, take all testimony, hear
argument, research any cases cited by the parties and write the decision."2 79
This is the reality of mass justice afforded in schemes like Workers'
Compensation. It is also to a large extent deliberate. Workers' Compensation
proceedings are designed to offer quick solutions to emergency situations.
They are not forums for litigation of all the rights and responsibilities
arising out of a particular transaction or occurrence. Even if feasible, it
would run counter to the intent and capabilities of such proceedings were
litigants to litigate "to the hilt" in order to protect against the subsequent
preclusive effects of adverse determinations.
Another consequence of the mixture of functions within an administrative
agency is that specialization by factfinders-even those couched in a cloak
of impartiality-may lead to institutional biases that influence the outcome
of particular adjudications. For example, the hearing examiner in Elliott
was an employee of one of the defendants in Elliott's federal suit. This is
by no means an unusual situation in the typical due process hearing afforded
discharged employees. The Court, faced with comparable situations involving a combination of functions within an agency, has held that given the
realities of the limitations of state and local agencies, this alone does not

276. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 35, at 569.

277. See Persehbacher, supra note 13, at 452, 454 (noting inappropriateness of applying
collateral estoppel to agency determinations because, inter alia, resolution of agency disputes
may be biased by agency's particular policies and combination of functions within agency).
278. See Resnik, supra note 229, at 978 n.660 (citing to state bar report finding that agency
in Kremer case-New York State Division of Human Rights-was unsatisfactorily discharging
its obligations due to inadequate budget).
279. See N. Y. Bar Committee Report, supra note 264, at 741.
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violate due process in the absence of explicit demonstration of bias. 2 0
However, the same considerations do not mandate that preclusion be
afforded the determinations of such agencies. While the cost to a state or
local agency of having to hire a non-employee decisionmaker to hear due
process claims might well outweigh the benefits of having such an extra
safeguard against bias, no such heavy cost would pertain were the Court's
administrative preclusion rule discarded.
Additionally, there is cause for concern about institutional competence
when bureaucrats make determinations that are binding on courts, especially
when agency personnel who do not routinely enforce civil rights laws-the
2
scenario in Elliott, for example-are the ones making such determinations. 1'
While judges may differ widely in ability, their occupations at least presume
some basic competence in deciding cases. No such presumption attaches to
an agency employee who, as one of many obligations, presides over adjudicatory hearings. And even as to those bureaucrats who specialize as
administrative law judges or hearing examiners, competence in deciding
areas within their sphere of presumed expertise does not translate into
competence in deciding questions outside that sphere.212 Expertise in determining whether an employee was fired for cause does not equate with
83
expertise in adjudicating racial discrimination.2
One might dispute the relevance to the preclusion analysis of any one of
these distinctions between the bureaucrat and the judge. After all, one might
argue, elected judges for fixed terms may not be as free of political biases
as judges appointed for life; on the whole, federal judges may be more
capable of adjudicating discrimination claims than state judges. Nonetheless
preclusion and full faith and credit apply to the determinations of all. It
is, however, the sum of the distinctions between most court judges and
most administrative judges-the pressures on the latter to render hundreds
of decisions in a fraction of the time most court judges have, the multiplicity
of functions performed by the bureaucratic decisionmaker and the limited
nature of his expertise-that is significant. All of these factors, although of
varying significance depending on the circumstances, undermine the desirability of a general presumption of administrative preclusion.

280. See, e.g., Winthrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52 (1975) (combination of investigative
and adjudicative functions within state licensing board does not per se violate due process);
cf. Shweicker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 197 (1982) (private insurance carrier employee could
serve as hearing officer on employer's denial of medicare claim).
281. Cf. Carlisle, supra note 192, at 94 ("[W]hen courts make these issue determinations
decisive in an administrative or arbitral forum, they surrender their authority to a hidden
judiciary. An independent judiciary may be compromised when its authority is diffused and
re-allocated under the banner of conserving resources and reducing caseloads.").
282. Cf. McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) (noting that unlike that
of court, arbitrator's expertise pertains to law of the shop, not law of the land).
283. See supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text.
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The Kremer case suggests a distinct although obviously related aspect of
the problem of administrative preclusion. As discussed previously, the

administrative "hearing" afforded Mr. Kremer did not meet the Restatement
criteria; Mr. Kremer's complaint was dismissed pursuant to the agency's
investigative determination that probable cause was lacking. Preclusion was
based not on the administrative determination itself, but on the application
of section 1738 to the state court review of that determination. The bottom

line in Kremer, nonetheless, was that Kremer was barred from having any
court hear his Title VII claim de novo, despite the explicit provision in Title

VII for such a right 28 4 and despite the fact that he never had any adjudicatory
hearing on his claim. Judicial review of administrative determinations is
generally quite limited in scope. Applying preclusion pursuant to section
1738 to such limited review of a purely investigative, as opposed to adju-

dicatory, determination is not justifiable under Restatement criteria at all.
Despite the Kremer majority's opinion that the process accorded Mr. Kremer
satisfied the minimum procedural requirements of the due process clause,2 5
any justification for applying preclusion must be distinct from any confi-

dence that the precluded litigant has had the kind of full and fair airing of6
28
his claim that would comport with traditional notions of due process.

The Kremer majority suggested-without expounding-that were section
1738 not applicable, the requirements for "a full and fair opportunity to

litigate" might well exceed those it concludes constitute the "minimum

287
procedural requirements" of the due process clause.
Although I argue in Part V that the Court has taken a misguided route

in its construction of section 1738, the battle for judicial revision of the

284. See Resnik, supra note 12, at 620-21 ("The redundancy built into schemes like title
VII was not accidental.... The designers.., were concerned-in my view, understandablyabout vesting sole factfinding authority in state agency decisionmakers.").
285. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 483-85; see Mann, supra note 46, at 436 ("The Court [in Kremer]
... simply recoiled from labeling the state proceedings constitutionally infirm and reasoned
backward from that reaction.").
286. See Mann, supra note 46, at 431 ("The standards enunciated in Kremer represent a
significant retreat from even minimal guarantees of procedural fairness."); id. at 438, 444-45
(arguing that denial of Kremer's right to press Title VII claim in federal court constituted
denial of due process).
287. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481:
Our previous decisions have not specified the source or defined the content of
the requirement that the first adjudication offer a full and fair opportunity to
litigate. But for present purposes, where we are bound by the statutory directive
of § 1738, state proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural
requirements of the ... Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith
and credit guaranteed by federal law.
Id. But see id. at 483 n.24 ("The Court's decisions enforcing the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the Constitution ... suggest that what a full and fair opportunity to litigate entails is the
procedural requirements of due process." (citations omitted)); see also Gore v. R.H. Macy &
Co., 52 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 39,509 (defendant did not have full and fair opportunity to
litigate in administrative forum, but rejecting defendant's claim that it was denied due process).
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Court's construction of section 1738 may well be over. Arguably, the Court
is not yet similarly entrenched in its view of the preclusive effect of
unreviewed agency determinations. I have argued that as a class, agency
proceedings do not afford the kind of "full and fair opportunity to litigate"
which has formed the bedrock of preclusion doctrine. But the range of
administrative decisionmaking mechanisms comprises numerous procedural
subclasses and the Court has yet to give sufficient guidance as to which of
these it believes fall within, and which without, the "full and fair opportunity to litigate. ' 28 8 In Elliott, the Court avoided the factual inquiry into
whether the state administrative hearing at issue in that case would constitute
a full and fair opportunity to litigate. The question was left for the lower
courts on remand. 28 9 We can presume that the kind of investigatory determination made in Kremer, had it not been reviewed by a state court, would
clearly fall without. If so, it must be that in the case of judicially reviewed
agency determinations, minimum standards of due process as the Court
understands them can be satisfied by less than a full and fair opportunity
to litigate, but that administrative preclusion, under Elliott, will only apply
when process beyond such minimum standards, process constituting a full
and fair opportunity to litigate, has in fact been afforded. The Court
appears to mean less than equivalency to judicial processes, or, as explicated
above, there would be little practical application to the theory of administrative preclusion since few, if any, administrative adjudications are in fact
the equivalent of judicial adjudications. Perhaps it is presumptuous to
assume the Court, in advance of a specific case or controversy, had any
specific intent as to what would constitute a "full and fair opportunity" to
litigate before an administrative forum. We-and the Court-may find some
guidance in the Court's own analysis in another area of preclusion law.
B.

The Parklane Criteria

In 1979, in ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore,290 the Court determined under
which circumstances federal courts appropriately might apply offensive
collateral estoppel so as to preclude a defendant from relitigating issues it
had lost in prior litigation against a party other than the plaintiff.29 1 While
288.
289.
290.
291.

See supra note 155.
Elliott, 478 U.S. at 799 n.8.
439 U.S. 322 (1979).
The facts of Parklane are incidental to the Court's discussion of the applicability of

offensive collateral estoppel. The defendant had lost a suit brought by the Securities and
Exchange Commission alleging that the defendant had issued false and misleading proxy
statements in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act. Shore brought a stockholder's
class action in which he sought partial summary judgment, seeking to estop ParkIane from
relitigating the proxy statement issue. The district court denied the motion for partial summary
judgment, and the court of appeals reversed. Id. at 324-25. The Supreme Court affirmed the
court of appeals, holding that estoppel should have been applied, despite the opportunity for

a jury trial in Shore's damage action which was unavailable in the SEC's action brought for
equitable relief. Id. at 332-33, 335-37.
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administrative preclusion was not at issue, some of the criteria the Court
identified in this context bear on the legitimacy of administrative preclusion.
The Court's principle focus in Parklane was fairness to the party-in this
case the defendant-against whom preclusion was asserted. 292 Did the defendant have incentive to litigate the first case vigorously? Were future
actions foreseeable? Was the judgment relied upon inconsistent with one or
more previous judgments in favor of the defendant? Were procedural
opportunities in the second action available that were lacking in the prior
action that might have affected the result? 93
Were the Supreme Court to deem this the relevant inquiry for the
application of administrative preclusion in a federal civil rights action,
seldom would the courts apply preclusion. The kind of foreseeability that
the Court contemplated in Parklane presumes a sophistication and ability
to make informed choices rarely applicable to the civil rights plaintiff who
has submitted some prior claim to an administrative agency. Since an
unrepresented-or underrepresented-claimant would be unlikely to anticipate the binding effect of the agency's determination in subsequent litigation,
he would frequently lack incentive, and perhaps ability, to litigate vigorously.
The party might never even contemplate the need to seek the advice of
counsel. In many instances, a claimant would not be able to afford counsel
even if he realized counsel's value. A worker's compensation applicant, for
example, is unlikely to anticipate the effect of that adjudication on any
subsequent claim, and even if he did, would have little ability to do anything
about it. The interests of neither society nor the individual worker would
be served by having that individual forfeit application for such benefits
solely to preserve the opportunity to subsequently bring a civil rights claim.2 94
Furthermore, the Parklane Court specifically recognized the absence of
an opportunity to engage in "full scale discovery" in the first action as the
kind of procedural disparity that would make the application of preclusion
inappropriate. In fact, the Court said in Parklanethat "[i]ndeed, differences
in available procedures may sometimes justify not allowing a prior judgment

292. Id. at 330-31. The Court also voiced concern about the possibility that plaintiffs would
adopt a wait-and-see attitude if offensive preclusion were freely applied. Id. at 329-30.
293. Id. at 330-31; see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982) (articulating
reasons for not applying issue preclusion consistent with Court's Parklane criteria).
294. Commentary to the Restatement suggests a similar result. To preserve the value of
expedient administrative relief under schemes like worker's compensation, the commentators
recognized the need to "confine the stakes to the matter immediately in controversy. Thus
issue preclusion may be withheld so that the parties will not be induced to dispute the
administrative proceeding in anticipation of its effect in another proceeding." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 comment h (1982); see also id. at § 28 comment d (preclusion
may be inappropriate as to decisions of courts designed for speedy, inexpensive determinations
of small claims).
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to have estoppel effect in a subsequent action even between the same

parties .... ,"295
In upholding the application of offensive collateral estoppel under the
facts of that case, the Parklane holding is consistent with other recent
Supreme Court cases expanding the reach of preclusion doctrine. Nonetheless, the limitations for the appropriate application of preclusion that the

Court proposes in dicta could arguably minimize the effective impact of
Elliott. If the criteria deemed applicable to offensive collateral estoppel in
court-to-court adjudication are applied to the Court's test of what constitutes
a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" in the administrative context, then
few if any civil rights cases will be precluded by prior administrative
determinations. 296 However, the mood of cases such as Elliott suggests

otherwise. Perhaps the difference is the Court's dedication to the spirit,
rather than the letter, of section 1738-that federal courts should generally
defer to state preclusion law. 2 7 Perhaps the difference is a more insidious
antipathy to civil rights claims. 291 Whatever the reason, drawing such distinctions disserves both the purpose of having administrative agencies as
less formal alternatives to court litigation, as well as Congress' intent in
passing the civil rights laws.
C.

A Word About Privity

An additional element to the "full and fair opportunity to litigate"
analysis involves the identity of parties. If the parties to the administrative

295. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331 n.15.
296. Courts consider whether parties had incentive to litigate their claim "to the hilt" in
assessing whether the first action provided a "full and fair opportunity to litigate." See Mann,
supra note 46, at 447 and cases cited therein. As to the Court's concern in Parklane about
applying preclusion when there have been prior inconsistent judgments, the Court's bifurcated
approach to administrative preclusion under Title VII and other civil rights statutes itself
increases the possibility of inconsistent judgments, as demonstrated by the Long case. See
supra notes 158-77 and accompanying text.
297. Nothing in Parklane, which was based on a federal claim, would require state courts
to similarly limit their application of preclusion. See Mobilia, Offensive Use of Collateral
Estoppel Arising Out of Non-JudicialProceedings, 50 ALB. L. REv. 305, 329 (1986) (criticizing
state court's application of offensive collateral estoppel given Parklane's focus on how
vigorously prior claim was litigated). See infra notes 323-30 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the federalism and comity issues involved.
298. See Resnik, supra note 12, at 616-19 (suggesting the preclusion rules the Court has
developed may reflect hostility by some members of the Court to particular substantive rights);
Resnik, supra note 229, at 970-71 (suggesting Court failed to apply its own Parklane criteria
to § 1983 claim in Allen). But see Perschbacher, supranote 13, at 438 (criticizing the application
of preclusion to facts of Parklane and suggesting distinct similarities between the SEC suit in
Parklane and administrative proceedings for purpose of preclusion analysis).

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:367

proceeding are not the same as the parties to the subsequent civil rights
action, then preclusion can only apply against a party to the prior action,
299
or someone in privity with a party to that action.

Not infrequently a discrimination complainant is not actually a party to
the administrative proceeding. Rather, an aggrieved person files a complaint,
and the government takes over. This is, for example, the procedure followed

by the Office for Civil Rights in enforcing Title VI. If OCR is unable to
voluntarily resolve a violation of Title VI, it will bring administrative
enforcement proceedings, or refer the case to the Department of Justice for

appropriate action. A complainant may or may not be allowed to intervene
in the proceedings. 30 In evidentiary proceedings brought by the New York
City Commission on Human Rights, the complainant has a right to intervene.3 0 Yet unrepresented complainants generally choose not to exercise
that right, in which case the Law Enforcement Bureau presents the case in
support of the complaint. 0 2 If the proceedings are determined adversely to
the government, will the complainant be precluded from bringing a private

right of action on the same claim or issues? 0 3 Substantial authority, including commentary to the Restatement, suggests not. 3 4 Yet there is authority
299. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 327 n.7 ("It is a violation of due process for a judgment
to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore has never had an
opportunity to be heard.").
300. Regulations provide that the complainant is not a party to any administrative proceedings, but may appear as amicus curiae. 34 C.F.R. § 101.23 (1988). It is not clear whether a
complainant would be able to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24
in any litigation the Department of Justice were to bring.
301. NEw YORuK Crry, N.Y. CHARTER AN ADnif.
CODE § 8-109(2)(b) (1986).
302. Author's conversation with Gretchen Flint, Assoc. Legal Director, Law Enforcement
Bureau, New York City Commission on Human Rights (July 17, 1989).
303. See Note, The Binding Effect of EEOC-Initiated Actions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 395
(1980) (arguing that adequacy of representation is key as to whether prior suit by EEOC binds
unnamed individuals in subsequent private actions). The reverse situation presents itself when
EEOC brings suit against an employer following an unsuccessful action brought by an individual
employee against the same employer, making similar allegations of employment discrimination.
EEOC v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 696 F. Supp. 1438, 1441 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (no preclusive
effect since EEOC was neither party nor in privity with party to prior suit). But cf. Donovan,
587 F. Supp. at 1420 (OSHA bound by an earlier adjudication against the complainant, even
though court acknowledged that the government's aim was to benefit employees generally).
304. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENT s § 83 comment c (1982) ("In some types of
administrative proceedings, the victim of a statutory wrong may complain to the agency but
not be given initiative or control of an enforcement proceeding. In such circumstances the
agency rather than the victim is the party to whom the rules of res judicata apply."); Colby
v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir. 1987) (individual not precluded by employer
victory in prior EEOC suit); Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201, 1203 (2d
Cir. 1972) (individual plaintiffs not bound by prior judgment against Attorney General in
favor of employer); see also Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, 829 F.2d 1056, 1061 (l1th Cir.
1987) (applying Alabama law, no claim preclusive dffect based on state court review of state
agency determination because plaintiff not allowed to intervene); cf. Student Pub. Interest
Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.
1985) (interpreting Clean Water Act provisions prohibiting private enforcement suit when
government is diligently prosecuting related civil or criminal action inapplicable to EPA
administrative enforcement action in which citizens were not afforded right to intervene).
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to the contrary, that privity exists because the government is acting in the
305
interests of the complainant.

Kremer suggests that when the state agency decision has been reviewed

by a state court, section 1738 requires that the federal court look to the
state's privity rules. In the absence of such review, federal courts are free

to apply their own rules. However, Elliott suggests that the Court will look
to the state privity rules nonetheless. The problem with this approach is the
lack of any assurance that the state rules will adequately protect the federal

interests involved. At a minimum, the federal court should engage in the
independent inquiry of identifying whether the government's interests in the
earlier proceedings were substantially different from the federal plaintiff's
interests in vindicating her statutory or constitutional rights. 301 If the dif-

ference is substantial, then it would be inappropriate, and arguably unconstitutional,30 7 to preclude the federal claim.
The apparent simplicity of having the federal courts look to the state's
own preclusion law is inadequate justification for ignoring the federal court's

responsibility to insure that the prior proceeding in fact, not just on its
face, constituted a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate for the party

against whom preclusion is asserted. Before Elliott, the various federal
courts demonstrated no consistent, cohesive approach assuring that they

would apply administrative preclusion only in cases where preclusion was
properly applied, and where the parties' rights to a hearing on their claim

were adequately protected. 0 The Elliott approach fares no better. It neither
produces a coherent doctrine of preclusion, nor does it adequately protect

competing federal or state interests in the enforcement of the civil rights
laws.

305. See, e.g., Rynsburger v. Dairymen's Fertilizer Coop., Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 269, 72
Cal. Rptr. 102 (1968) (private nuisance suits estopped by adverse determination in public
nuisance suits since private litigants deemed in privity with government representatives); EEOC
Compl. Man. (CCH) 2130 (July 1986) at 2179 (whether Kremer would bar complainant from
pursuing federal remedies after determination adverse to state agency will depend on whether
state would consider complainant in privity with state agency). The EEOC takes the position,
however, that if it decides to pursue such a case it would not be precluded by the determination
adverse to the state agency. See id.
306. See Ojellum, 829 F.2d at 1061 ("Whatever interests the Jefferson County Personnel
Board had in the proceedings before the circuit court were substantially different from Gjellum's
interests in vindicating his constitutional rights."); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 696 F. Supp.
at 1440 ("EEOC fills two roles, one as representative of the charging parties and another as
guardian of the public interest"); Note, supra note 303, at 400 (because EEOC plays two
roles, at times these interests may conflict and private interests may suffer).
307. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (Illinois court violated due process by
applying preclusion to determination in proceeding in which plaintiff was not adequately
represented).
308. See Perschbacher, supra note 13, at 458 and cases cited therein ("Current rules provide
no assurance that collateral estoppel will be limited to circumstances where the administrative
proceeding was procedurally equivalent to a judicial trial.").

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
V.

THE FEDERAL

AND STATE

[Vol. 65:367

INTERESTS IN PRECLUSION

The Court's conclusion in Elliott that section 1738 only applies to court
determinations, and not to those of state administrative agencies, may not
be very convincing, 309 but more problematic is the Court's failure to weigh
appropriately the various state and federal interests involved in adopting a
common law of issue preclusion, which, except for Title VII cases, accomplishes the same purpose. In fact, the Court's expansive approach to
preclusion ignores sound bases for recognizing exceptions. Whether or not
section 1738 was intended to apply to unreviewed state agency determinations, federal courts need not, and should not, afford preclusive effect to
such determinations in subsequent federal civil rights litigation.
A.

Rules and Exceptions

If the Court was wrong to conclude in Elliott that section 1738 was
inapplicable to unreviewed agency determinations, that has important implications for the Court's analysis of preclusion and Title VII. The distinction the Court drew in Kremer and Elliott would fail. The Court held in
Elliott that Congress intended that state agency determinations without
benefit of state court review would have no preclusive effect on subsequent
federal Title VII claims, 310 and in Kremer that federal courts must accord
the same preclusive effect to reviewed state agency determinations that they
would receive from the courts of their own states. But the Court only
reaches this result by concluding that section 1738 trumps Title VII, although
Title VII trumps federal common law rules of administrative preclusion.
Analytically, at least for administrative proceedings in which agencies have
acted in a judicial capacity and have not offended due process, 311 the
decision on preclusion should not depend on whether or not a state court
has reviewed the administrative determination.
The Court has created this problem for itself by rigidly interpreting
section 1738 in cases such as Allen, Migra and Kremer and demonstrating
rare willingness to find exceptions. It is this rigidity that has infused the
Court's application of preclusion to unreviewed state agency determinations
as well, with the limited exception of Title VII.

309. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
310. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 795 (1986).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), the ... EEOC ... must give "substantial weight
to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings
commenced under State or local [employment discrimination] law." As we noted
in Kremer, it would make little sense for Congress to write such a provision if
state agency findings were entitled to preclusive effect in Title VII actions in
federal court.
Id. (citation omitted).
311. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982).
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While the Court has acknowledged in the recent civil rights cases that
Congress could create exceptions to section 1738, it has insisted that Con-

gress must do so explicitly, or, at the least, that implied exceptions are
disfavored.3 12 Yet the Court has traditionally allowed exceptions to constitutional preclusion when giving preclusive effect would damage a sister
state's interests in matters of local concern.31 3 For example, in Thomas v.
Washington Gas Light Co., 31 4 the Court held that the strong state interest
in the administration of worker's compensation schemes justifies not precluding the forum state from awarding the plaintiff additional benefits
despite a sister state's prior adjudication of the claim. 31 5 Similarly, the Court
has historically found exceptions to preclusion in state-federal cases. 316

312. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99 (1980) ("Since repeals by implication are
disfavored, much clearer support than this would be required to hold that § 1738 and the
traditional rules of preclusion are not applicable to § 1983 suits.") (citing Migra, Kremer,
Elliott). But cf. Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 191 (3d Cir. 1982) (Gibbons,
J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress intended § 1981 claims to have federal forum despite
state civil judgments to the contrary).
313. See Smith, supra note 28, at 85-94 and cases discussed therein; see also RaSTATEMENT
(SEcoND) oF CONFLICT oF LAWS § 103 (1983).
A judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be recognized
or enforced in a sister State if such recognition or enforcement is not required
by the national policy of full faith and credit because it would involve an
improper interference with important interests of the sister State.
Id.
314. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
315. Id. at 285. Although the Court held in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S.
430, 444 (1943), that full faith and credit is applicable to the determinations of sister states'
worker's compensation boards, the Court modified the Magnolia decision in subsequent cases.
Thus in Thomas and its predecessor, Industrial Comm'n of Wis. v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622
(1947), the Court found exceptions to the applicability of full faith and credit. Thomas
suggested that both the limited jurisdiction of the Virginia compensation commission, and the
informality that existed in such proceedings and was encouraged by the state, were reasons
not to apply
an unnecessarily aggressive application of the full faith and credit clause ....
For neither the first nor the second State has any overriding interest in requiring
an injured employee to proceed with special caution when first asserting his
claim. Compensation proceedings are often initiated informally, without the advice
of counsel, and without special attention to the choice of the most appropriate
forum.... This informality is consistent with the interests of both States. A
rule forbidding supplemental recoveries under more favorable workmen's compensation schemes would require a far more formal and careful choice on the
part of the injured worker than may be possible or desirable when immediate
commencement of benefits may be essential.
Thomas, 448 U.S. at 284-85 (citation omitted).
316. See Smith, supra note 28, at 95. Smith identifies cases in which federal courts have
refused to apply preclusion based on state court judgments when to do so "would conflict
with a congressional scheme of federal remedies and federal jurisdiction." Id. He notes,
however, that these cases arose in terms of resolving conflicting claims of federal and state
rules of preclusion, id., and that Allen was the first case analyzed in terms of whether Congress
intended a particular federal statute-§ 1983-to create an implied exception to § 1738. Id. at
95 n.210. Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313 n.7, 322-23 (1983), argues Smith, expressed a
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Thomas actually concerned the effect of a Virginia judgment in subsequent
District of Columbia proceedings.31 7 Another example is Brown v. Felsen,

in which the Court refused to bar a bankruptcy proceeding creditor from
raising a defense impliedly conceded in settlement of state proceedings on
the debt. 1 8 The Court noted that resjudicata"blockades unexplored paths

that may lead to truth," that it "is to be invoked only after careful
inquiry," and that the interests served by preclusion would not be furthered
by applying it in that case. 319 Both Thomas and Felsen demonstrate that

there can be exceptions to preclusion even within the confines of constitu3 20
tional or statutory full faith and credit.
2
Both Thomas and Felsen endorsed exceptions only to claim preclusion. '
Nonetheless, their reasoning supports the inappropriateness of administrative

issue preclusion as well.3 22 To afford preclusive effect to the determinations

of state administrative agencies ignores strong federal policies, such as
insuring that individuals' civil rights are protected by the process they are

willingness to recognize exceptions to preclusion in certain § 1983 claims. Smith, supra note
28, at 75-76. Smith suggests that Migra does not negate a case-by-case approach to determine
the applicability of claim preclusion exceptions. Id. at 79-80; see also Atwood, supra note 12,
at 73-76.
317. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 263-64. Although the Court wrote mostly in terms of constitutional
full faith and credit, it acknowledged that § 1738, as well as the clause, was applicable to its
analysis. Id. at 266 n.10.
318. 442 U.S. 127, 132 (1979). The Court said that the decision regarding preclusion was
to be made only after examining the interests served by preclusion, the state court's interest
in "orderly adjudication," and the federal interests reflected in the federal statute. Id.; see
Atwood, supra note 12, at 74-75 (discussing Felsen). The Court in Felsen did not explicitly
discuss full faith and credit, but rather relied on general principles of preclusion. Felsen, 442
U.S. at 132-39. Before Allen, the federal courts seldom discussed state-federal preclusion in
terms of § 1738. See Smith, supra note 28, at 64-65.
319. Felsen, 442 U.S. at 132.
320. Exceptions of course exist as well to the application of res judicata and collateral
estoppel when full faith and credit is not implicated. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTs
§§ 26, 28 (1980) (exceptions to claim preclusion and issue preclusion, respectively); Reed v.
Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 208-09 (1932) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (arguing that rigid adherence to
res judicata rules would cause perverse results). But see C. WRIrGH, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 4426 (1981) ("The premise of preclusion
itself is that justice is better served in most cases by perpetuating a possibly mistaken decision
than by permitting relitigation .... The fairness of preclusion is addressed directly by imposing
requirements of foreseeability and similarity of legal context, and by recognizing changes in
the legal climate.").
321. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 281-82.
To be sure ... the factfindings of state administrative tribunals are entitled
to the same res judicata effect in the second State as findings by a court. But
the critical differences between a court of general jurisdiction and an administrative agency with limited statutory authority forecloses the conclusion that constitutional rules applicable to court judgments are necessarily applicable to
workmen's compensation awards.
Id. The Felsen decision leaves open the question of whether collateral estoppel would apply.
Felsen, 442 U.S. at 139 n.10.
322. In fact, Thomas' discussion of the lack of sophistication of the average worker's
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due under the Constitution and by the remedies Congress provided to
redress violations of those rights. These federal policies are no less important
than the state interest in administering worker's compensation benefits, and
thus no less entitled to exemption from any general rule of preclusion.
B.

Reconciling Federal and State Interests

In order to evaluate the competing claims made by preclusion on one
hand, and the need for federal forums and remedies for redressing federal
rights on the other, one must evaluate the competing and complimentary
state and federal interests in having preclusion-claim or issue-apply to
the administrative determinations of state agencies in subsequent civil rights
litigation. Federal and state courts share a common interest in finality to
disputes, and in uncluttered court dockets. And, in both federal and state
remedial schemes, administrative agencies play an important role in providing prompt, expeditious and inexpensive forums for the resolution of
disputes. Neither federal nor state courts have much interest in hearing cases
that could be resolved easily and fairly at the agency level.
Nonetheless, the most significant factor that seems to have motivated the
Court in recent years to choose preclusion over competing civil rights
interests is its belief that section 1738 requires the federal courts to apply
state preclusion law. And in state agency-federal court preclusion the same
principles motivating the Court's interpretation of section 1738, namely
comity and federalism, logically compel the formulation of a common law
rule to accomplish the same goals the Court ascribes to Congress in the
promulgation of section 1738.
Federal courts should not interfere with the necessary resolution of issues
of fact by state agencies such as workers' compensation or disciplinary
boards. But allowing the resolution of these facts to completely preclude
reexamination of the same facts in subsequent civil rights actions unnecessarily sacrifices legitimate federal interests.1 23 Both federal and state courts

compensation litigant, and the states' interest in expedient, informal adjudication of workers'
compensation claims is the only truly compelling response to Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
argument that nothing had precluded Thomas from originally pursuing his claim in the District
of Columbia, rather than Virginia. See Felsen, 448 U.S. at 294-95 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
323. See Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, 829 F.2d 1056, 1064-65 (11th Cir. 1987), where
the court refuses to extend Elliott's holding to claim preclusion because:
[Tihe importance of the federal rights at issue, the desirability of avoiding the
forcing of litigants to file suit initially in federal court rather than seek relief in
an unreviewed administrative proceeding, and the limitations of state agencies as
adjudicators of federal rights override the lessened federalism concerns implicated
outside the contours of the full faith and credit statute.
Id.; Leaman v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation, 825 F.2d 946, 958 (6th Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (Keith, J., dissenting), which criticizes the majority's 8-6 split decision holding the Ohio
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are concerned with the derogation of state administrative determinations by
federal courts. The Court's decisions in Allen,3 24 Migra,3 25 KremerP26 and
Elliott327 all manifest that concern. Preclusion is one response to those
concerns, but it is not the only nor the best response.3 2 Although granting
preclusive effect to state judgments promotes comity and federalism, it may
also deter litigants from using state processes to resolve state-based claims
in order to preserve their federal civil rights claims. 329 If this occurs, the
Court can hardly claim that the state's interests are being served. In fact,
the states will be deprived of opportunities to interpret their own laws, and
to resolve disputes arising under those laws, free of unnecessary federal
330
interference.
In addition to frustrating state interests, this does not further Congress'
purpose in passing federal civil rights legislation like section 1983. Despite

Revised Code § 2743.02(A)(1) to operate as a statutory waiver of any subsequent federal claim:
[T]he majority exalts a state waiver provision above a plaintiff's right to seek
relief for unconstitutional acts, rewards a litigant's diligent pursuit of ... § 1983
remedies with total exclusion from a state or federal forum and characterizes the
effect of its holding in terms of a simple contractual metaphor, as if Constitutional
rights are bushels of wheat.
Leaman, 825 F.2d at 958.
324. 449 U.S. at 95-96 ("[R]es judicata and collateral estoppel not only reduce unnecessary
litigation and foster reliance on adjudication, but also promote the comity between state and
federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of the federal system.").
325. Migra v. Warren School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84 (1984) ("This reflects a
variety of concerns, including notions of comity ..
").
326. 456 U.S. at 478 ("Depriving state judgments of finality would violate basic tenets of
comity and federalism ..
").
327. 478 U.S. at 798 ("Having federal courts give preclusive effect to the factfinding of
state administrative tribunals also serves the value of federalism.").
328. Ironically perhaps, one of the arguments pressed on the Court as to why it should
establish an exhaustion requirement for § 1983 actions in Patsy was that such an approach
would promote "the goal of comity and improve federal-state relations by postponing federalcourt review until after the state administrative agency had passed on the issue; and would
enable the agency which presumably has expertise in the area at issue, to enlighten the federal
court's ultimate decision." Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 512 (1982) (emphasis
added). An exhaustion requirement would have been inconsistent with the preclusion of
relitigation of issues determined by the administrative tribunal; nonetheless, the Court's refusal
to adopt such a requirement fails to establish the validity of applying preclusion when parties
submit their claims first to the state agency.
329. See discussion supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
330. Compare Kremer, 456 U.S. at 505 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that by encouraging complainants to bypass state courts, state courts will not have opportunity to correct
state agency errors, thus affecting quality of state agency decisionmaking. "It is a perverse
sort of comity that eliminates the reviewing function of state courts in the name of giving
their decisions due respect.") with id. at 478 (disputing importance, but not validity, of this
argument); see also Catania, supra note 176, at 269 n.234 ("In view of Congress' intent to
encourage states to combat employment discrimination, it is doubtful that it intended to force
complainants to abandon state administrative proceedings in order to protect their rights under
Title VII."); Braveman & Goldsmith, supra note 272, at 624 (to preserve federal forum,
litigant may bypass state administrative and judicial proceedings, depriving state of opportunity
to further its own policies).
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the Court's statements to the contrary, Congress did not intend to require
that civil rights claims be resolved in judicial rather than administrative
"
forums.33
' What Congress intended was the presence of a federal forum to
resolve federal claims that have not been satisfactorily resolved through
other dispute resolution mechanisms, including state agency and court
proceedings.

C.

What We Can Learn from the States

Because the Court has instructed lower federal courts to apply state
administrative preclusion rules, it is useful to look at these rules to better
inform our understanding of the consequences of federal preclusion doctrine.
Although state courts today332 generally embrace the principle that preclusion
may attach to the determinations of administrative agencies, 333 they often
make exceptions when the circumstances warrant. 3 4 Some state courts, and
some federal courts interpreting state law, have made exceptions when the
findings of agencies designed for the expedient resolution of disputes, such
as unemployment compensation boards, are relied on in attempts to bar
subsequent civil rights claims. 35 Furthermore, several states, including Cal331. See Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 241 n.16 (1985) (" '[T]he
dominant characteristic of civil rights actions' is that 'they belong in court,' " citing Burnett
v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 (1984)); see also detailed discussion in Attorneys' Fees, supra note
42, at 396 n.134.
332. See REsTATEiENT (SECOND) OF JUDGIENTS § 83 reporter's note (noting that first
Restatement had no counterpart to § 83 because at time of its promulgation, the general rule
was that administrative determinations were not considered adjudications for preclusion purposes).
333. See, e.g., Brown v. Dow Chem. Co., 875 F.2d 197, 199 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that
under Arkansas law, preclusion applies to decisions and findings of administrative commission
acting in quasi-judicial capacity, citing, inter alia, Bockman v. Arkansas State Medical Bd.,
229 Ark. 143, 147, 313 S.W.2d 826, 829 (1958)); Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157,
161 (10th Cir. 1963) (interpreting Kansas preclusion law to afford preclusive effect to Kansas
Corporation Commission's determination in subsequent diversity suit for damages); People v.
Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 651 P.2d 321, 186 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982); Ryan v. New York Tel. Co.,
62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984); Carlisle, supra note 192, at 63-64
(New York courts have recently expanded application of collateral estoppel to determinations
made in administrative hearings).

334. See Catania, supra note 176, at 230.
[M]any states will not apply issue preclusion if it was not foreseeable that the
issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action, or the party did not
have the incentive or opportunity to litigate the issue fully in the prior proceeding,
or the burden of persuasion has shifted or is different in the second proceeding.
With respect to claim preclusion, a state may also recognize the party's right to
split his claim if the court or agency hearing the first proceeding did not have
the subject matter jurisdiction to render complete relief.
Id. (citing generally A. VrsALr, REs JuDIcATAIPREcLUsIoN 397-427 (1969)); see also Carlisle,
supra note 192, at 78 (stating that while the New York Court of Appeals has reiterated that
preclusion applies to administrative determinations, it has acknowledged, in Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d 520, 523, 373 N.E.2d 987, 989, 402 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808-09
(1978), that the decision whether to grant such determinations preclusive effect proved "remarkably elusive").
335. See, e.g., Kelley v. TYK Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 1188, 1194-95 (3d Cir. 1988)
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ifornia, Missouri and New York, have recently enacted legislation further
336
limiting the preclusive effect of unemployment compensation proceedings.

There is, however, no consistent approach to administrative preclusion
(Pennsylvania would not apply preclusion to reviewed workers compensation decision in
subsequent § 1981 racial discrimination complaint, relying on Odgers v. Commonwealth
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 514 Pa. 378, 525 A.2d 359 (1987), which held
that determination that work stoppage was strike for purposes of the Public Employee Relations
Act was not preclusive of whether action was strike for purposes of workers compensation
scheme, because two statutes were enacted to further entirely different policies); Ross v.
Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 361-62 (4th Cir. 1985) (Maryland would not
apply preclusive effect to reviewed workers compensation decision in subsequent Title VII
action, relying on Cicala v. Disability Review Bd., 288 Md. 254, 418 A.2d 205 (1980), which
held defendant was not precluded from relitigating whether injury was service related in case
where workers compensation board had ruled for plaintiff, because of substantial difference
in two statutory schemes); Clapper v. Budget Oil Co., 437 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(adverse determination by Department of Jobs and Training that plaintiff had voluntarily
terminated his employment did not estop subsequent age discrimination, breach of contract
and wrongful termination claims); Board of Educ. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal
Bd., 106 A.D.2d 364, 482 N.Y.S.2d 495, 497 (1984) (no preclusion because plaintiff lacked
full and fair opportunity to litigate, couldn't foresee that application for unemployment
benefits would bar subsequent discrimination complaint and because state law gave state
Division of Human Rights jurisdiction over discrimination complaint) relied on in Hill v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 786 F.2d 550, 553-54 (2d Cir. 1986) (employment discrimination suit not
barred for plaintiff who lost before court reviewed state unemployment insurance proceedings);
see also Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 705 (3d Cir. 1989) (New Jersey would not afford
preclusive effect to state court affirmance of arbitration decision in subsequent Title VII
litigation because of lack of identity of issues decided); Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275,
276 (2d Cir. 1986) (§ 1983 plaintiff who prevailed in state Article 78 proceeding was not
estopped since, under New York law, claim preclusion would not apply as Article 78 proceeding
was limited to injunctive relief).
336. CAL. UNmMP. INS. CODE § 1960 (West Supp. 1989) (added by Stats. 1986, ch. 283, §
1); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 288.215 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (L. 1988, H.B. No. 1485, § A, eff. March
1, 1988); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 623(2) (McKinney 1988) (as amended L. 1987, ch. 258, § 1).
The reasoning behind such legislation supports a cautious approach to administrative
preclusion generally. The New York statute, for example, was prompted by a report issued by
the Committee on Labor and Employment Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, recommending legislation to remedy the court of appeals decision in Ryan, 62
N.Y.2d at 494. Ryan afforded preclusive effect to an unemployment insurance determination
in subsequent litigation brought by Ryan against his employer for false arrest, malicious
prosecution, slander and wrongful discharge. Id. at 495. The Committee's report criticized the
decision on a number of grounds:
It is the Committee's view (a) that unemployment insurance proceedings, designed
for quickly determining the narrow issue of benefit eligibility, do not afford the
kind of hearing and review that should warrant giving preclusive effect to the
finding or determinations made; and (b) that it would frustrate the purposes of
the Unemployment Insurance Law to force adjudication of questions relating to
other potential civil litigation into that forum. The Committee also believes that
deciding on an ad hoc basis whether any particular unemployment insurance
determination might properly be given preclusive effect creates an undesirable
lack of certainty about the possible future ramifications of the agency's actions.
This uncertainty will inevitably cause parties to seek to resolve collateral matters
before the unemployment insurance referees ... or before the Unemployment
Insurance Appeal Board.
Accordingly, this report recommends legislation preventing findings of the
Administrative Law Judges or the Appeals Board from being given preclusive
effect in any other proceeding.
N.Y. Bar Committee Report, supra note 264, at 738.
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among the various states.33 7 A number of states have had little to say on
the subject altogether. 3
The Court's approach has a facile, Erie-type339 integrity: The preclusive
effect of a state administrative agency will be accorded the same preclusive
effect in federal civil rights litigation (other than Title VII) that the state's
own courts would accord it. The problem is that while it may create
consistency intra-state, it creates inconsistency inter-state.34° Preclusion rules
on federal claims may differ depending on the state of the agency that

made the administrative determination. While this might be appropriate for
state-law based claims brought in federal court,3 41 it is entirely inappropriate

for federal claims manifesting federal policies such as the civil rights laws.3 42
This is not to suggest that federal courts, when unencumbered by state
preclusion rules, have shown any greater pattern of consistency. However,

the Court is in a position to provide guidance towards a coherent approach.
Preclusion is not necessary to protect the legitimate state interest that
federal courts honor the determinations of state agencies. Federal courts

can accord appropriate deference to the findings of state administrative
tribunals short of precluding the relitigation of issues or claims raised before

337. Compare, e.g., Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 1012, 478 N.E.2d
195, 196, 489 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (1985) (discussed in Carlisle, supra note 192, at 82 as implying
that full and fair opportunity to adjudicate can be satisfied on basis of paper record, where
party opposing preclusion had no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him) with
Clapper, 437 N.W.2d at 726 (administrative hearing in which formal rules of evidence and
procedure do not apply, hearsay is admissible, and agency oversees participation by attorney
does not constitute full and fair opportunity to litigate for purposes of preclusion).
Nor is there necessarily consistency even intra-state.See N. Y. Bar Committee Report, supra
note 264, at 749 ("Lower court cases, even after Ryan, continue to be decided contrary to
each other, and practitioners are thus left without adequate guidance.. . .") CompareBrugman,
478 N.E.2d at 195 with Gore v. R.H. Macy & Co., 52 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 39,509
(refusing to give preclusive effect under Ryan standards to unemployment compensation
proceeding determination that plaintiff did not engage in misconduct upon finding that
defendant lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate plaintiffs discrimination claim in
administrative forum).
338. See, e.g., Clapper, 437 N.W.2d at 725 ("Whether to give collateral estoppel effect to
an administrative determination is an issue of first impression in Minnesota."); 2 CAL. JUR.
3D Administrative Law § 239 (1973) (stating that California courts have not given sufficient
systematic consideration to issues of administrative preclusion).
339. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal court sitting in diversity is to
apply substantive law of state in which it is located).
340. See Atwood, supra note 12, at 105 (discussing claim preclusion where federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction: "Federal court adherence to the res judicata law of each individual
state could result in an inconsistency among the federal courts in their treatment of claims
which are their exclusive prerogative.").
341. Even as to state-based claims, it requires the federal courts to be fully familiar with
the preclusion doctrine of the particular state, including all exceptions to that doctrine. See
Catania, supra note 176, at 229 (Court's interpretation of § 1738 requires federal courts to
apply states' exceptions as well as general preclusion rules).
342. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (federal policy overrides
conflicting state policies in applying Erie-analysis).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:367

such tribunals. Persuasion rather than preclusion will best accommodate the

competing and complimentary state and federal interests in insuring deference to state agency determinations and the legitimate assertion of federal
civil rights claims. In Part VI, I develop such an alternative approach.

VI.

A BETTER WAY

The Court, not Congress, has adopted a presumption in favor of preclusion. The Court assumes that preclusion should apply, unless Congress has
specified to the contrary.3 43 I would adopt a reverse presumption in applying
preclusion to the determinations of administrative agencies in subsequent
civil rights litigation. Administrative preclusion is generally inconsistent with
Congress' intent in passing civil rights legislation, and courts should refrain
from applying the doctrine to foreclose civil rights litigation so as not to
frustrate the policies underlying these laws. 3"
An alternative to preclusion is needed so that federal courts will accord
administrative determinations appropriate deference without being disabled
entirely from either the opportunity or the responsibility to entertain federal
civil rights claims.145 In this Part, I demonstrate that this might be accom-

343. To date, Title VII is the only exception. See discussion supra notes 134-35 and
accompanying text. There has been some recent activity in Congress to set additional limits
on preclusion. In May of 1989, the Subcommittee on Human Resources of the House Committee
on Ways and Means entertained a bill which would prohibit any court (state or federal) from
affording preclusive effect to determinations made under state unemployment compensation
laws. H.R. 2369, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); see Testimony of Congressman Bruce A.
Morrison before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means,
May 24, 1989 (citing "increasing misapplication of the principle of collateral estoppel" as
creating need for such legislation).
344. See University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 803 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Due respect for the intent of the Congress that enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 . . .
should preclude the Court from creating a judge-made rule that bars access to the express
legislative remedy enacted by Congress."); cf. Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496,
501-02 (1982). In rejecting the application of an exhaustion requirement to claims brought
under § 1983, the Court stated:
Of course, courts play an important role in determining the limits of an exhaustion
requirement and may impose such a requirement even where Congress has not
expressly so provided. However, the initial question whether exhaustion is required
should be answered by reference to congressional intent; afd a court should not
defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a federal statute unless it is consistent
with that intent.
Id.
345. Much of what I propose might justify an exception to preclusion based on agency (or
arbitral) determinations in other litigation as well. To make that leap, however, goes beyond
this current undertaking. Some critics of expanding preclusion advocate a transubstantive
approach. See, e.g., Carlisle, supra note 192, at 97-98 (arguing that courts should allow one
opposing issue preclusion based on administrative findings to create rebuttable presumption of
nonpreclusion by demonstrating, case by case, the existence of procedural or evidentiary factors
making preclusion inappropriate). However others advocate less preclusion for civil rights
claims. See, e.g., Braveman & Goldsmith, supra note 272, at 599-600 (arguing that although
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plished by utilizing administrative agencies' factual determinations to create
presumptions and alter burdens of proof. This is a sound alternative to
preclusion, 3" which accommodates comity and federalism interests as well
as concerns that plaintiffs should not be afforded multiple shots at litigating

the same claim or issue. Yet unlike preclusion doctrine it will not impair
the usefulness of administrative agencies as alternatives to court litigation
for the informal, speedy and economical resolution of disputes. Further,
such an approach is no abrupt departure from traditional approaches to

shifting burdens of proof, or how courts generally treat agency determinations, in civil rights litigation. It would, however, require the Court-or
Congress 347-- to abandon the recent path the Court has taken.

A.

The Proposal

I propose the following: Courts would have discretion to alter burdens
of prooR" that would otherwise apply in federal civil rights litigation, based

expansion of preclusion rules is reasonable response to scarce judicial resources, there is danger
of fundamentally unfair application to civil rights litigants); Resnik, supra note 12, at 605-06
(criticizing the Court's transubstantive approach to preclusion); see also Crosby, Administrative
Collateral Estoppel in California:A CriticalEvaluation of People v. Sims, 40 HAsTINGs L.J.
907 (1989) (criticizing California Supreme Court's application of preclusion to unreviewed fair
hearing determination in subsequent criminal prosecution and arguing for limitations on
administrative preclusion).
346. Why not have the federal courts decide case-by-case whether to apply preclusive effect
to the determinations of administrative agencies? The problem with such an approach is that
it would fail to fulfill the reasons for having rules of preclusion in the first place. Parties
would not be able to predict the preclusive consequences of what they do, and do not, litigate
in one litigation for purposes of subsequent litigation, if preclusion were at the discretion of
the secondary forum. Thus, as in the case of unemployment compensation proceedings,
sophisticated litigants might still attempt to litigate "to the hilt" for fear that a subsequent
court would apply preclusive effect to the initial tribunal's determinations. Furthermore,
litigating whether or not preclusion should apply can be as costly and complicated as pursuing
the underlying substantive claim. See N. Y. Bar Committee Report, supra note 264, at 747-48.
347. Since Elliott is a common law rule of preclusion the Court could undo it without any
congressional direction. However, Congress could explicitly dictate that preclusion should not
apply. See, e.g., H.R. 2369, supra note 343. As to the Court's interpretations of § 1738, a
congressional response might be more appropriate than were the Court to revisit this issue of
statutory interpretation. Nonetheless, the Court certainly could correct its own error; cf.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2371 (1989) (declining to overrule prior
interpretation of § 1981 despite doubt about earlier construction, but recognizing that overruling
may be appropriate where precedent is "found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or
with the social welfare") (citation omitted).
348. Burdens of proof are procedural devices that may affect substantive rights significantly.
See, e.g., Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory
of Procedural Justice, 34 VanD. L. REv. 1205, 1207 (1981) ("[Ihe concept of burden of
proof is one of the most important procedural notions in our legal system; it helps implement
the substantive laws by instructing the factfinder on the degree of confidence he should have
in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of case," (citing, inter alia,
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979))). The term "burden of proof" includes two
concepts, that of burden of production (the burden of producing affirmative evidence) and
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on agencies' factual determinations that meet certain minimum criteria.
Administrative proceedings that meet Elliott's "full and fair opportunity to
litigate" test,3 49 would not be the basis for either claim or issue preclusion;
however administrative findings introduced into evidence would create a
presumption in favor of the party who prevailed on the resolution of that
issue before the agency. This presumption may alter the burden of persuasion
as well as the burden of production on the issue previously adjudicated. 5 0
The result would be either a shift of the burden from one party to the
other, or an increase in the standard of proof for the party who already
has the burden.3 51 In addition to its operation in the event of trial, the
presumption may control the disposition of a motion for summary judgment
by the party relying upon it.352
If administrative findings do not meet the Utah Construction test, or, as
to state agency determinations, state law would afford such findings no
preclusive effect, then such findings would create no presumptions, and
current doctrine would determine admissibility.
Irrespective of the above, both issue and claim preclusion may be applicable if the party seeking to invoke preclusion can demonstrate that:
(I) the parties knowingly have agreed that the current adjudication is
to be a final adjudication of all rights and liabilities arising from the
transaction or transactions at issue, or that the determination of an
issue or issues in the current adjudication is to bind the parties in
subsequent litigation; or
(II) (A) the administrative proceedings afforded all relevant procedural
safeguards afforded by the judicial proceedings;
(B) the party opposing preclusion had incentive to litigate vigorously before the administrative tribunal;

the burden of persuasion (the burden of convincing the factfinder that you meet the applicable
standard of proof). See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126
(1989) (distinguishing burden of production from burden of persuasion regarding employer's
business justification in Title VII suit).
349. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 797-98 (quoting from United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co.,
384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966)).

350. See Belton, supra note 348, at 1222 ("The weight of authority holds that genuine
presumptions are neither evidence nor substitutes for evidence, but are merely procedural
devices that shift the burden of producing evidence to the party against whom it operates.
They are rebuttable and not conclusive. . . ."). My proposal would use presumptions more

aggressively than that suggested by Belton to shift or otherwise alter both burdens of proof.
The presumption would be deemed to establish the fact, subject to rebuttal by the opposing
party. Cf. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 35, at 628 (suggesting tripartite approach to
official notice, one part of which would permit agency to take judicial notice of facts subject
to rebuttal).
351. For example, plaintiff who lost below might now have to demonstrate by "clear and
convincing evidence" rather than by "a preponderance of the evidence" that she was entitled
to relief.
352. Unless the party opposing preclusion produces material, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a material issue of fact, the party relying on preclusion would prevail. See
FED. R. Crv. P. 56(e).
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(C) (if claim preclusion) the party opposing preclusion could have
raised the federal claim before the administrative proceedings
and such proceedings could have afforded comparable remedies to those available in federal court; and
(D) the party opposing preclusion knew or should have known
that subsequent proceedings on the claim or issue would be
precluded; or
(III) a federal statute explicitly provides that preclusion shall apply to
the administrative decision.

B.

Presumptions in Practice

This approach would work as follows. A defendant who had lost on the
discrimination issue before an agency whose procedures met the minimum
criteria would have the burden of proving the absence of discrimination.
That is, the plaintiff could avail herself of the presumption that discrimination occurred, based on the administrative findings, thus shifting both
the burden of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion to the
defendant. This type of case might arise where the administrative agency
granted only a partial remedy.
Alternatively, if plaintiff had lost before the agency and thereafter filed
a federal civil rights claim, she would have to overcome the presumption
that defendant did not discriminate. Since plaintiff normally would have
the burden of proof in such a case, she would have to prove discrimination
'
by "clear and convincing" evidence rather than a mere "preponderance." 353
In either case, the party seeking to rely on the administrative findings
might use them in support of a motion for partial or total summary
judgment. That party would prevail unless the opposing party was able to
demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. For example, posit
that plaintiff had lost below against a state defendant in state fair employment administrative proceedings on a claim of sexual harassment. She
subsequently files a claim under Title VII and section 1983, again alleging
sexual harassment. On the strength of the previous administrative findings,

353. This proposal is not inconsistent with the analysis of the application of the clear and
convincing standard in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1792 (1989) (plurality
opinion). The decision rejected the lower court's application of the clear and convincing
standard to an employer seeking to establish that it would have made an employment decision
irrespective of any discriminatory motive. However, Justice Brennan acknowledged that the
standard, when applied, is more appropriately used defensively rather than offensively-for
example, as applied to the plaintiff in a defamation case.
Although there is legitimate skepticism as to whether any meaningful distinction exists in
application (as contrasted with theory) among various standards of proof such as "preponderance of the evidence" and "clear and convincing evidence"-or even "beyond a reasonable
doubt," see, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 409-10 (1978) (discussing relevant
literature demonstrating wide disparities of perceptions regarding quantum of proof necessary
under various standards), I do not believe we should abandon efforts to draw such distinctions
in the absence of more satisfactory alternatives.
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defendant moves for summary judgment on both claims. If plaintiff is
unable to produce any314 probative evidence that the administrative fact-

findings are deficient, then defendant would prevail.35 5 However, if plaintiff
offers such evidence, then plaintiff would have demonstrated the existence
of a material issue of fact, entitling her to go to trial.35 6 Yet to prevail at
trial, she would still have to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
35 7
that she had been sexually harassed.

354. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986), suggest that lower courts may weigh the probity of evidentiary
submissions on motions for summary judgment, in particular where the non-moving party
would bear a heightened burden of proof at trial, id. at 252-55. While inappropriate in general,
see Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary
Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 95, 115-16 (1988)
(discussing the contradictions and inappropriateness in the Court's approach to weighing
evidence on motions for summary judgment), it is particularly inappropriate in the context of
civil rights litigation. See id. at 161 (enhanced summary judgment usually will work to benefit
of defendants, society's "haves," and to disadvantage of plaintiffs, the "have nots"). Thus I
would accompany my suggested alternative to preclusion with a strong admonition that doubts
as to probity should be resolved in favor of denying such motions for summary judgment.
See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255 ("The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.... Neither do we suggest that the trial
courts should act other than with caution in granting summary judgment ....

")

(citation

omitted).
355. In fact, plaintiff and her attorney might be liable to the defendant for Rule 11 sanctions
for bringing a claim not "well grounded in fact [or] warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law .... " FED. R. Civ. P.
11. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 252-54 (2d Cir.
1985) (ordering award of attorneys' fees under Rule 11 to defendants who prevailed on
summary judgment, because of, inter alia, plaintiffs' previous loss in state court).
356. Plaintiff might also resist defendant's motion by demonstrating that the administrative
adjudicator applied an incorrect legal standard. The court, of course, should entertain any
questions of law de novo. In the absence of a record, findings, or conclusions of law enabling
the court to ascertain exactly what facts the agency found, or what legal standard the agency
applied, doubts should be resolved in favor of allowing plaintiff to proceed to trial.
357. I have grossly oversimplified questions concerning burdens of proof in discrimination
cases in general and in Title VII cases in particular. The complexity of issues regarding burdens
of proof in Title VII cases continues to occupy the Court and scholars alike. See, e.g., Wards
Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (plaintiff retains ultimate burden of proving pretextual nature of
employer's asserted business justification in disparate impact case); Price Waterhouse, 109 S.
Ct. at 1787-88 (plurality opinion) (in mixed motive cases, burden of persuasion, as well as
burden of production, shifts to employer once plaintiff has met burden of persuasion that
discrimination was a substantial cause of adverse employment decision); Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank and Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2790 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that in
disparate impact case, burden of persuasion always remains with plaintiff, even when burden
of production shifts to defendant); id. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that in
disparate impact cases, both burdens shift to defendant once plaintiff establishes prima facie
case); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1981) (burden of
persuasion remains with plaintiff even when plaintiff makes out prima facie case of discriminatory treatment that shifts burden of production to defendant); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate impact shifts burden
of proof to defendant); Belton, supra note 348, at 1211-12 (advocating a rule that would treat
both statutory exceptions and judicially created defenses as affirmative defenses, shifting both
burdens to the defendant once plaintiff established his prima facie case); Furnish, A Path
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If, however, plaintiff could demonstrate that the administrative proceedings did not afford her a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in
question under the Utah Construction criteria-for example, that the administrative factfinder had failed to consider a relevant issue of law or
fact-then the admissibility of the administrative proceedings would be
determined under current doctrine,358 and would not operate to create
presumptions or alter burdens of proof.
While my approach would presume the inapplicability of administrative
preclusion in federal civil rights litigation, such a presumption might be
rebuttable in one of three ways.359 First, if the parties have expressly or
impliedly stipulated that the administrative adjudication would bind them
in future litigation, either as to issue or claim preclusion, then, in the
absence of additional reasons for formulating an exception,3 6° the court
3 61
should comply with the parties' agreement.
Second, if the administrative proceedings are the equivalent of judicial
proceedings in all relevant respects, then the court should have the discretion
to invoke preclusion.32 As to claim preclusion, the party opposing preclusion
must have had the opportunity to raise his federal claim in the administrative
proceedings, and such proceedings must have afforded a comparable remedy
to what a federal court might award. Furthermore, the party opposing

Through the Maze: DisparateImpact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REv. 419 (1982) (advocating different
rules on burdens of persuasion for disparate impact and disparate treatment cases); Smith,
Employer Defenses in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Reassessment of Burdens of
Proof and Substantive Standards Following Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 55 Tai~p. L.Q. 372, 394-96 (1982) (advocating allocation of burden of persuasion to
employer in disparate impact cases based on analogy to affirmative defense burden in disparate
treatment cases). My proposal, if adopted, would likely generate a myriad of questions as to
how the proposal would operate in pretext and mixed motive cases. These must be addressed
at a later day. Generally, though, I am advocating that the burden would be one notch harder
for the party who had lost before the administrative agency, regardless of what the pre-existing
burden would be.
358. See infra notes 383-89 and accompanying text.
359. See Perschbacher, supra note 13, at 459 (advocating rebuttable presumption against
issue preclusion based on administrative findings in all subsequent litigation).
360. Such reasons would include fraud, duress or procedural irregularities in the administrative proceedings or the agreement that such proceedings be binding.
361. See Perschbacher, supra note 13, at 459 (applying issue preclusion to protect and
promote parties' expectations corresponds to original historical basis for collateral estoppel).
362. For example, the court would look to whether or not the agency proceedings afforded
notice, an opportunity for direct and cross-examination, the right to subpoena adverse witnesses,
an impartial fact-finder, and comparable discovery opportunities. The word "relevant" is
important, however. Even if the judicial proceeding afforded some procedural opportunities
not afforded by the administrative proceedings, this would not be determinative of the
preclusion question. The party seeking to rely on preclusion would have the opportunity to
demonstrate that the additional procedures would not be relevant to the outcome. Procedural
opportunities would include differences in burdens of proof. This approach assumes, I believe
accurately, that there are hearings that would constitute a "full and fair opportunity to litigate"
under Elliott, yet would nonetheless not be the procedural equivalent of a judicial proceeding.
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preclusion must have had reason to litigate vigorously below with an actual

or presumed understanding of the consequences such administrative litigation
might have on subsequent proceedings. 363 The burden should be placed on
the party seeking to rely on preclusion to demonstrate that all of these

364
criteria are met.
Third, preclusion will apply if Congress has explicitly provided for the

application of preclusion to administrative findings in federal civil rights
legislation. Given the evidence that applying preclusion to the determinations

of administrative agencies in federal civil rights litigation is inconsistent with
Congress' intent in passing civil rights legislation, 65 the responsibility should
be Congress', not the Court's, to state otherwise.

C. Advantages and Disadvantages
This approach will go far towards addressing the Court's concerns regarding finality, repose and repeated bites at the apple. It makes sense to
accord appropriate deference to administrative findings; in the absence of

some evidence to the contrary, there is little justification for assuming that
the administrative determinations were erroneous. 66
Furthermore, this solution would eliminate the-problematic dichotomy
between Title VII and other civil rights schemes created by Elliott. The
language in Title VII that persuaded the Court that Congress intended that

unreviewed administrative determinations should have no preclusive effect
in subsequent Title VII litigation was that the EEOC was to "accord

363. Thus factual findings of discrimination in a Title VI fund termination proceeding
against a school accused of discriminating on the basis of race, in which the school is
represented by counsel and has every incentive to litigate vigorously, might be preclusive to
the extent similar findings by a court would be preclusive in a subsequent § 1983 suit against
the school brought by one of the alleged victims of racial discrimination. Such a case would
rely on the criteria the Parklane Court articulated for offensive collateral estoppel. See supra
notes 290-95 and accompanying text.
364. Compare Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating
that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) res judicata is affirmative defense; thus party
asserting bar bears burden of showing its applicability) with Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62
N.Y.2d 494, 501-02, 467 N.E.2d 487, 491, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 827 (1984) (holding that party
asserting collateral estoppel has burden of demonstrating sameness of issue decided, but that
party opposing preclusion must demonstrate absence of full and fair opportunity to litigate).
365. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
366. See Price Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1802 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (justifying shifting
the burden of persuasion that the action would have been taken but for the consideration of
impermissible discriminatory factors to the employer in a mixed motive case):
If as we noted in Teamsters, "presumptions shifting the burden of proof are
often created to reflect judicial evaluations of probabilities and to conform with
a party's superior access to the proof," one would be hard pressed to think of
a situation where it would be more appropriate to require the defendant to show
that its decision would have been justified by wholly legitimate concerns.
Id. (citation omitted).
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substantial weight to final findings and orders made by the State or local
authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local [employment
discrimination] law."3 67 My approach would accord such weight, without
depriving litigants with Title VII or any other civil rights claims, of an
opportunity to have a federal court consider them.
Consider how this approach would have altered the result in Long v.
36
Laramie County Community College District.
The state agency had found
that Ms. Long was the victim of sexual harassment, and awarded some
relief. When she subsequently sued for additional remedies under both Title
VI and the reconstruction era civil rights statutes, the court of appeals
rejected the agency's findings of sexual harassment for purposes of the
former claims, while holding, under Elliott, that it was bound by such
findings for purposes of the latter. Under the alternative I propose, there
would be no need for a different approach under Title VII-where Congress
explicitly precluded preclusion-and the reconstruction era statutes. For
both claims, the court would consider the administrative findings. If the
findings in Long had altered the burdens of proof, then the school would
have been required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it had
not sexually harassed Ms. Long.369 While we don't know whether this shift
would have helped Ms. Long, it would have had the benefit of consistency
and integrity for the decisionmaking process. The ultimate judicial finding
on the claim of sexual harassment would have been consistent for Title VII
and reconstruction era claims alike, an approach far preferable to the one
engendered by Elliott.
The alternative I propose will also allow a consistent approach to the
myriad of variables discussed in Part III. It resolves any questions about
whether Elliott would apply to claim as well as issue preclusion.3 70 It would
apply whether or not the administrative proceeding had been reviewed by
a state court under a limited standard of review. Thus it would resolve the
problems caused by the Kremer Court's affording preclusive effect to purely
investigatory determinations. 3 7' It would apply whether or not a litigant was
statutorily required to present his claim to an administrative agency prior
to seeking judicial relief, 72 and whether or not the litigant was a voluntary
or involuntary party before the administrative tribunal. 373 As to whether it
would resolve questions about findings made by "nonexpert" tribunals, the
discretion accorded the court under my proposal could be exercised so as

367. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 795 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982)).
368. 840 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 158-77 and accompanying text.
369. This, again, assumes that the court finds the administrative proceedings met due process
standards, a finding the court in Long in fact made. Long, 840 F.2d at 751.
370. See supra notes 178-205 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 206-14 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 215-27 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 228-49 and accompanying text.

INDIATA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:367

to refuse to create presumptions in cases where there is reason to doubt the
competence of the adjudicator to make the particular factual determination
at issue. 374 Finally, the approach would apply to both state and federal
3 75
administrative determinations.
D. No Radical Departure
This alternative is consistent with the way courts dealt with agency
determinations before the Supreme Court's recent expansion of preclusion
doctrine. Courts have traditionally accorded deference to agency findings
and, in some cases, have altered burdens or standards of proof based on
such findings. In Freedom Savings and Loan Association v. Way, 376 a preElliott case, the Eleventh Circuit held that the findings of the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) were not preclusive in a subsequent
trademark infringement suit. The court's determination was based on its
reading of Congress' intent in the Lanham Act to provide for "extensive
judicial involvement in the registration and protection of trademarks. 3 77
Nonetheless, the court relied on precedent of both the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits to the effect that decisions of the TTAB would control in a
subsequent infringement suit "unless the contrary is established by evidence
that, in character and amount, carries 'thorough conviction,' ' 37 and that
such a standard of proof arose "out of respect for the expertise of the
379
TTAB.,

Congress adopted a similar approach to the one suggested here in its
1966 amendments to the federal habeas corpus statute, albeit with regard
to state court, not agency findings.38 0 The statute provides for a presumption
of correctness to be accorded a state court determination of a factual issue
on a habeas claim, unless the petitioner is able to demonstrate one of eight
enumerated deficiencies in the state court proceedings. The presumption
operates to shift to the petitioner the burden to establish "by convincing
evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous." '3s'
Under the habeas statute, however, if petitioner is able to demonstrate a
deficiency in the state court proceedings, for example that the factfinding

374. See supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
376. 757 F.2d 1176 (lth Cir. 1985).
377. Id. at 1180 ("Section 1071(b) of Title 15 U.S.C.A. (1982) empowers courts to hear
appeals from TTAB de novo.").
378. Id. at 1181 (quoting American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494
F.2d 3, 10 (5th Cir. 1974); Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Texas Pharmacal Co., 335 F.2d
72, 74 (5th Cir. 1964)).
379. Way, 757 F.2d at 1181.

380. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1977).
381. Id. Thus the statute also operates as an explicit exception to § 1738. See Atwood,
supra note 12 at 73.
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procedures did not afford a "full and fair hearing," then the federal court
32
is to afford no presumption of correctness to the state court findings.
Even in the absence of a specific congressional directive, courts have altered
burdens and standards of proof only when the agency findings so warranted.
In Jane Doe v. New York University,383 for example, the district court
refused to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant
based on administrative findings that the school had discriminated. 384 First,
the court noted that the plaintiff and the school were not technically
adversaries in the administrative proceedings."' Second, the agency conducted no hearings, but rather made its determination pursuant to an
investigation.38 6 Third, agency officials were not impartial arbiters, but rather
investigators and potential adversaries of the school. 3 7 The Court's analysis
was consistent with my approach; since the administrative proceedings did
not meet the Utah Construction criteria, no shifting of burdens was appropriate.
While refusing to shift the burden of proof, the Jane Doe court held that
the agency findings would be admissible at trial, and that the weight to be
accorded them would be determined after argument as to their credibility.3 8
The approach in Jane Doe is similar to the one the Court articulated in the
civil rights arbitration cases.38 9 It is a sound approach in those circumstances

382. Selz v. State of California, 423 F.2d 702, 703 (9th Cir. 1970).
383. 511 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
384. Id. at 610. The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) had found that the school's refusal to
readmit plaintiff as a medical student because of her mental condition violated the school's
nondiscrimination obligations concerning the handicapped. Id. at 608.
385. Id. at 609.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 610. This observation is based not on the officials' assigned responsibilities, but
rather on the court's inference of bias in how they fulfilled these responsibilities. As one of
the OCR officials responsible for the investigation and findings in this case-I was Chief
Regional Civil Rights Attorney-I realize that my assessment that bias was not a factor in the
agency's determination that the school was in fact responsible for discrimination under § 504
might be susceptible to an accusation of lack of objectivity.
388. Id. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 863 n.39 (1976) ("Prior administrative
findings made with respect to an employment discrimination claim may, of course, be admitted
as evidence at a federal-sector trial de novo.") (citation omitted); Ross v. Communications
Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 363-64 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that while preclusion was
inapplicable, second tribunal may consider findings of first); cf. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that extent of deference to
administrative findings left to discretion of district court on direct review of administrative
findings under EHA which provides: "[T]he court shall receive the records of the administrative
proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision
on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is
appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982)). Other scholars have agreed on the appropriateness
of introducing administrative findings as evidence, rather than using them for purposes of
preclusion. See, e.g., Perschbacher, supra note 13, at 461 nn.182-83; Carlisle, supra note 192,
at 98 n.215.
389. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974) ("The arbitral decision
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when it would be inappropriate-for the reasons set out above-either to

invoke preclusion or to create presumptions that shift or alter burdens of
proof.
CONCLUSION

In recent years the Supreme Court has extended inappropriately the
application of statutory and common law preclusion to state administrative
determinations. This extension has undermined the purpose of the civil
rights laws in particular, and has overlooked the reasons for utilizing

administrative agencies for more informal, less expensive resolution of
disputes. This erosion of judicially guaranteed civil rights protection is both

unnecessary and dangerous. By refocusing its inquiry, the Court-or Congress-could satisfy the justifiable functions of preclusion (finality, efficiency, predictability, comity) by utilizing presumptions and alterations in
burdens of proof to grant appropriate deference to agency decisionmaking

without eliminating access to federal forums for protection of federal civil
rights.

may be admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate.").
While the Court expressed no view on what weight that should be, stating that it should
depend on the circumstances, it cautioned the court to keep in mind that Congress intended
for Title VII plaintiffs to have a "judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory
employment claims." Id. at n.21; accord McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284,
292 n.13 (1984); see also Motomura, Arbitration and CollateralEstoppel: Using Preclusion to
Shape ProceduralChoices, 63 TutL. L. REv. 47, 81-82 (1989) (preclusion should generally not
be afforded arbitral findings since courts' admission of arbitral findings into evidence satisfies
desire for consistency).
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